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NEVADA ALIMONY:  AN IMPORTANT
POLICY IN NEED OF A COHERENT
POLICY PURPOSE
The Honorable David A. Hardy*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2006, my friend and colleague Judge Chuck Weller1 was shot in
the chest as he stood before the panoramic windows of his third-floor office.
The shooter, who had killed his wife just hours before, was a disgruntled family
law litigant in Judge Weller’s department.2  These violent crimes cannot be
explained by custody or visitation distress, as Judge Weller had ordered the
parents to share joint legal and joint physical custody of their minor child.3
Instead, it appears these crimes were animated by the shooter’s misperceptions
of Judge Weller’s financial rulings.  No rational explanation exists for such
irrational crimes.  I mention this series of events merely to illustrate the depth
of emotions that exist within family law disputes.  Family law attorneys and
judges repeatedly observe these emotions as they strive to assist spouses rede-
fine their post-marriage lives.
The divorce process is difficult, even for those who seek to end the mar-
riage.  Litigants often respond negatively when their relationships and
resources are at risk.  A divorce proceeding culminating in trial represents a
failure of our legal system.  The adversarial process requires parties to empha-
size their virtues and their respective spouses’ flaws.  The divorce proceeding is
both expensive and destructive.  For this reason, Nevada family division district
judges are directed to encourage nonadversarial and nontraditional methods of
dispute resolution.4  In short, resolution designed and accepted by the parties is
preferred over trial.
Alimony is a particularly troubling feature of Nevada matrimonial law.
Nevada attorneys and judges are ill-equipped to facilitate pretrial resolution
when alimony is at issue.  No objective measures are available for judging fair-
* Judge David A. Hardy was appointed to the Second Judicial District Court, Family
Division, Washoe County, Nevada in 2005.  Prior to his appointment to the bench, Judge
Hardy was an elder and disability law attorney with the Law Firm of Hardy & Woodman.
1 Judge Chuck Weller was elected to the Second Judicial District Court, Family Division,
Washoe County, Nevada in 2004.
2 Martha Bellisle, Opening Words Paint Contrasting Motives, RENO GAZETTE-J., Oct. 25,
2007, at 1A.
3 Martha Bellisle & Jaclyn O’Malley, Warrent Charges Sniper Suspect in Fatal Stabbing of
Estranged Wife; Mack Left ‘Angry’ by Divorce Settlement, Friend Says, RENO GAZETTE-J.,
June 14, 2006, at 5A.
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.225(1) (2007).
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ness or predicting results.5  The newly-enacted statutory guidelines,6 based
upon Nevada decisional authority, provide no guidance as to their relative
weight and little guidance regarding their purpose.  Several of these statutory
guidelines focus on antiquated notions of need and duty.  As discussed later in
this Article, no analytical reference point exists for settlement discussions.  Ali-
mony is therefore judge-specific, idiosyncratic, inconsistent, and unpredict-
able.7  As noted by one commentator, alimony is the “source of much
inconsistency among trial courts, unhappiness among litigants, and conflict
among critics.”8
The Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged problems with the Nevada ali-
mony statute more than 120 years ago when it approved the following excerpt
from counsel’s argument in a divorce case:
The popular ignorance, even in the legal profession, of the law of marriage and
divorce, has, in times not long past, been so dense as almost to exclude from the
legislation on this subject [alimony] its proper forms.  Largely the statutes contain
expressions and provisions of whose meanings, and especially of whose consequent-
ial effects, their makers pretty certainly had no clear idea whatever.  Instead of con-
sistency and verbal propriety, they abound in absurdities.  They are often chaos.9
The issue remains in chaos for those at the front line of alimony litigation.
Dating back to Nevada’s territorial status in 1861, Nevada judges awarded ali-
mony when “just and equitable.”10  These conjunctive terms apply to both
payor and recipient.11  Nevada law provides little guidance for what the words
“just and equitable” mean or how they should inform the alimony decision.
While judges enjoy great discretion, they suffer from the absence of a coherent,
sustainable policy rationale.  Judicial discretion is best exercised when it is pur-
pose driven.  This Article synthesizes the constituent components of Nevada
alimony law, which appear to have been developed haphazardly during the past
century.  This Article concludes with a request for more purpose-specific gui-
dance from the Nevada Legislature and Supreme Court.  Family-centered liti-
gation emotions may then be diffused through better informed and better
articulated pretrial alimony resolutions.
5 Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals:  Applying an Income Adjust-
ment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 23 (2001).
6 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(8) (2007).
7 Leslie Herndon Spillane, Spousal Support:  The Other Ohio Lottery, 24 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 281, 282 (1998); Robert E. Gaston, Alimony:  You Are the Weakest Link!, NEV. LAW.,
Oct. 2002, at 8, 9; Marshal Willick, In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony,
NEV. LAW., Apr. 2007, at 40, 40.
8 Jennifer L. McCoy, Spousal Support Disorder:  An Overview of Problems in Current Ali-
mony Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 501, 502 (2005) (quoting Megan A. Drefchinski, Com-
ment, Out with the Old and In with the New:  An Analysis of Illinois Maintenance Law
Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and a Proposal for Its Replacement, 23 N.
ILL. U. L. REV., 581, 613 (2003)).
9 Lake v. Bender, 7 P. 74, 75 (Nev. 1885).
10 Act of Nov. 28, 1861, ch. 25, 1861 Nev. Stat. 70-71.
11 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(8)(a) (2007).
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II. HISTORICAL & CONTEMPORARY PURPOSES OF ALIMONY
A. Common Law
Contemporary alimony has been described as an “accident of history” that
has been extended through “inadvertence rather than deliberation.”12  A com-
parison of historical alimony with contemporary alimony reveals this to be at
least partially accurate.  Nevada law is predicated upon the English common
law.13  Section 1.030 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides that “[t]he com-
mon law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or the Constitution and laws of this
State, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this State.”14
Alimony, which comes from the Latin word alimonia, was a rule of suste-
nance to ensure the wife’s food, clothing, habitation, and other necessities for
support.15  In early England, alimony was grounded in antiquated notions of
gender inequality.  For example, under the doctrine of coverture, a wife’s legal
identity merged with her husband, creating a single legal identity.16  The hus-
band controlled the assets, including the wife’s pre-marriage assets.17  The wife
transferred to her husband her ability to “hold real property, sign contracts, and
keep any earnings.”18  In turn, the husband incurred the legal duty to support
his wife.19  The Church did not recognize the indissolubility of marriage.
Therefore, absolute divorce (a vinculo matrimonii) required an act of Parlia-
ment and was rarely granted.20  Scholars report that Parliament granted only
317 absolute divorces in the 150 years preceding the Matrimonial Causes Act
of 1857.21  The English ecclesiastical courts did permit divorce from bed and
board (a mensa et thoro), which was a form of legal separation allowing the
spouses to live apart.22  Because the marriage remained intact, the husband
continued to control his wife’s assets and be responsible for his wife’s needs.23
Alimony prevented the wife from becoming a public charge.  Marital fault
12 Collins, supra note 5, at 28.
13 The Nevada Supreme Court has also acknowledged the Spanish common law as a minor
influence upon Nevada law. See Nixon v. Brown, 214 P. 524, 527 (Nev. 1923) (noting the
Spanish civil law of community property was adopted by Nevada).
14 § 1.030; see also Darrenberger v. Haupt, 10 Nev. 43 (1875) (noting that marital property
acquired before the Nevada Constitution and statutes were adopted must be governed by the
rule of common law).
15 Connelly v. Connelly, 362 N.W.2d 91, 92 (S.D. 1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting); see
also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (8th ed. 2004).
16 Lara Lenzotti Kapalla, Some Assembly Required:  Why States Should Not Adopt the ALI’s
System of Presumptive Alimony Awards in Its Current Form, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 207,
211.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Collins, supra note 5, at 28-29.
21 Id., at 29; see also Elizabeth A. Heaney, Pennsylvania’s Doctrine of Necessities:  An
Anachronism Demanding Abolishment, 101 DICK. L. REV. 233, 235 (1996) (discussing the
doctrine of necessities).
22 Collins, supra note 5, at 28.
23 McCoy, supra note 8, at 504.
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determined the amount of alimony, but the general rule was that the wife
received one-third of her husband’s income.24
B. Nevada’s Recognition of Historical Origins of Alimony
The Nevada Supreme Court recognized the common law doctrine of cov-
erture in several decisions.  Its first published reference to alimony occurred in
1866, just two years after statehood.25  The Court did not examine post-divorce
alimony in this decision; it merely approved the concept of alimony pendente
lite in the form of attorney’s fees.26  However, the Court did note a married
woman’s “property is generally entirely under the control of the husband.”27
Therefore, a “tyrannical husband might abuse his wife to any extent and protect
himself from the consequences the law visits on such conduct, by denying her
the means of asserting her rights in a court of justice.”28
Nine years later, in 1875, the Court again noted:
[a]t common law the existence of common property is not recognized in the marital
relation.  By the marriage, the legal existence of the wife is suspended or incorpo-
rated into that of the husband; she becomes sub potestate viri; is incapable of holding
any personal property, or of having the use of any real estate; her earnings belong to
her husband, and he is liable for her support.29
The Court referred to the ecclesiastical courts of England in an 1882 deci-
sion.30  And in a related case, also decided in 1882, the Court reiterated:
[i]n England the jurisdiction of divorce cases was committed to the ecclesiastical
courts.  Under the practice of these courts the parties were . . . ‘in effect both plaintiff
and defendant at the same time.  So that, for example, one proceeded for divorce a
mensa et thoro . . . .’31
In 1884, the Court noted that before the Nevada Statute of 1865:
the property rights of husband and wife were governed by the common law . . . [I]t is
conceded that property acquired during coverture presumably belongs to the commu-
nity . . . .
. . . .
[A]fter divorce [is] granted to plaintiff the law imposes upon defendant the duty of
supporting her according to his ability and condition in life.32
24 See Collins, supra note 5, at 61.  For general discussions of English common law, see
Mani v. Mani, 869 A.2d 904, 908-09 (N.J. 2005).
25 Wilde v. Wilde, 2 Nev. 306, 306 (1866).  The very first reference to alimony from the
Nevada geographical area is found in Kenyon v. Kenyon, 24 P. 829 (Utah 1861).  There, the
Utah Territorial Supreme Court considered an appeal from the district court in Carson
County. Id. at 829.  The district court did not enter an absolute divorce—it granted a divorce
from bed and board and awarded alimony of $2,500.00. Id.
26 Wilde, 2 Nev. at 306.
27 Id. at 307.
28 Id.
29 Darrenberger v. Haupt, 10 Nev. 43, 45-46 (1875).
30 Lake v. Lake, 16 Nev. 363, 369 (1882).
31 Wuest v. Wuest, 30 P. 886, 886 (Nev. 1882) (citation omitted).
32 Lake v. Lake, 4 P. 711, 722-23, 730 (Nev. 1884).
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As late as 1920, the Nevada Supreme Court still referred to coverture as a
basis for alimony.33  A husband was jailed for contempt because he did not pay
court-ordered alimony.34  The Court noted that alimony is a
mere allowance for support and maintenance—a duty growing out of the marriage
status; a duty which sound public policy sanctions to compel one who is able so to
do, possibly as a result of the co-operation (during coverture) of his former wife, to
prevent such former wife from becoming a public charge or dependent upon the
charity of relatives or friends.35
The Court then approved the following statement of law:  “[T]he decree
for alimony is an order of the court to the husband, compelling him to support
his wife by paying certain sums, and thus perform a public as well as a marital
duty.”36  In 1970, the Court again noted at “common law, there was no final
divorce, only a judicially decreed separation . . . .”37
Absolute divorce has always been available in Nevada, and alimony has
always been a feature of Nevada law.  Thus, it appears the English tradition of
continuing support when divorced from bed and board was transmuted in
Nevada without explanation into necessitous support after an absolute divorce
was granted.
C. Post-Coverture Purposes for Alimony
The analytical framework for alimony began to lose constancy with the
end of coverture and advent of absolute divorce.  If alimony was support during
legal separation, awarded when the wife did not enjoy her own legal identity,
“why does [it] continue to exist as an incident to divorce?”38  The pragmatic
answer is that divorce historically resulted in tremendous financial burdens for
women.  Even though women enjoyed their own legal identity, they did not
enjoy economic parity or equality of economic opportunity.  Women also sub-
ordinated their economic opportunities to the socially valuable, but noncom-
pensatory care work of family and home.  Marriage was viewed as a contract,
the breach of which left many women unable to support themselves.39
There should be little doubt that alimony provides an important mecha-
nism for remedying economic injustice caused by divorce.  But if alimony is
important, it should be easily grounded in an articulated, sustainable policy
rationale.  Otherwise, alimony opponents will continue to decry the awards as
social engineering, peonage, or perpetual involuntary servitude.40
33 Ex parte Phillips, 187 P. 311, 312 (Nev. 1920).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Bailey v. Bailey, 471 P.2d 220, 221 (Nev. 1970).
38 Collins, supra note 5, at 24.
39 Alfred J. Sciarrino & Susan K. Duke, Alimony:  Peonage or Involuntary Servitude?, 27
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 67, 69 (2003); see generally Wuest v. Wuest, 30 P. 886 (Nev. 1882).
40 Sciarrino & Duke, supra note 39, at 71 (noting the numerous arguments that alimony
prevents the bonds of marriage from being dissolved; instead, it merely transmutes the bonds
of marriage into bonds of servitude—a “judicially mandated system of lifetime serfdom”).
See also Brad Reagan, Getting the Better Half, SMART MONEY, July 2007, at 82, 84 (noting
that “[f]or as long as divorce has existed, men have griped about their divorce settlements—
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Nevada does not provide a coherent policy rationale for why, when, and
how alimony should be awarded.  Many national scholars have offered contem-
porary rationales for alimony.41  While the rationales vary, they are susceptible
to three different categories.  The first category reflects the historic purpose of
alimony:  support calculated by the wife’s needs and limited by the husband’s
ability to pay.42  The second category reflects contemporary rationales indepen-
dent of alimony’s coverture origins.  These rationales suggest alimony is com-
pensation to a former spouse by “rewarding efforts in homemaking,
childrearing, interruption of a career, or contributions to the success of the
other.”43  The second category of rationales are “based on theories of contract
or partnership law, of economic or personal dislocation, and on general equita-
ble principles of compensation” and are referred to collectively as “economic
loss” rationales.44  Finally, the third category of rationales is grounded in public
policies such as fault deterrence and welfare avoidance.45  I briefly introduce
the economic loss rationales composing the second category in this Article.
D. Alimony as Compensation for Economic Losses
A recurring theme for economic loss proponents is the injustice that
results upon dissolution of marriage when one spouse subordinates her eco-
nomic utility to child-rearing and other domestic endeavors.  In this Section, I
briefly articulate the arguments set forth by contract theorists, partnership theo-
rists, reliance theorists, and legal theorists in support of the “economic loss”
rationale in favor of alimony.
For contract theorists, the timing of contractual promises is asymmetrical:
[T]he wife typically delivers her promise early in the marriage (by bearing and rear-
ing children), whereas the husband delivers his promise later in the marriage (by
providing adequate financial support to his family).  Since the husband’s income as
the primary wage-earner usually increases as he approaches the peak of his career, at
a time when the wife has already “performed” her part of the marriage contract, the
husband has an incentive to exit the marriage at this later stage.  Thus, divorce may
have a detrimental impact on the economic well-being of wives, especially if they
had been full-time homemakers during marriage.46
perhaps most succinctly in Jerry Reed’s 1982 hit single, ‘She Got the Goldmine (I Got the
Shaft)’”).
41 Collins, supra note 5, at 40-48 (introducing 10 different rationales for contemporary
alimony).
42 Id. at 39.
43 Id. at 39-40.
44 Id. at 40.
45 Id.  Alimony for fault deterrence is not applicable in Nevada.  Alimony for welfare avoid-
ance appears antiquated; nevertheless, as recently as 1989, the Nevada legislature recognized
alimony in lieu of welfare as a consideration for rehabilitative alimony.  Fondi v. Fondi, 802
P.2d 1264, 1268 n.5 (1990).
46 Aspasia Tsaoussis, Protecting Homemakers’ Marriage-Specific Investments Under No-
Fault Divorce:  A Model for Restructuring Alimony in Civil Law Countries, 6 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 217, 220-21 (2004).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ203.txt unknown Seq: 7  1-MAY-09 8:57
Winter 2009] NEVADA ALIMONY 331
A criticism of the contract theory is the measure of damages.  Expectation
is the standard measure for breach-of-contract damages, but expectancy dam-
ages are awarded only against a breaching party.47
Partnership theorists focus on the spouses’ investments into the marital
partnership.  Divorce deprives a partner of the return to which she is entitled.48
Thus:
[s]pouses who interrupt careers to stay home to raise children, work to put their
partners through graduate or professional school, or relocate to further their spouses’
careers have made personal contributions whose dividends would be expected to
accrue only in the future; in such cases, the return on the investment is obliterated by
a divorce . . . . This compensatory aspect of maintenance reflects the reality that
when one spouse stays home and raises the children, not only does that spouse lose
future earning capacity by not being employed or by being underemployed subject to
the needs of the family, but that spouse increases the future earning capacity of the
working spouse who, while enjoying family life, is free to devote productive time to
career enhancement.49
Several commentators describe alimony as a division of the husband’s
“career asset,” which an employed spouse generally builds through increased
employment power during marriage.50  For some divorcing couples, the eco-
nomically superior spouse’s career asset is one of the more valuable marital
assets.  However, a career asset cannot be divided upon divorce and allowing
the husband to retain the career asset built upon the wife’s contributions would
result in the husband’s unjust enrichment.  Therefore, alimony is an adjunct to
property division.  Judge Posner explains:
[Alimony] is a method of repaying the wife (in the traditional marriage) her share of
the marital partnership’s assets.  Often the principal asset to which the wife will have
contributed by her labor in the household or in the market . . . [such as when a wife
supports her husband while he is in graduate school] is the husband’s earning capac-
ity.  This is an asset against which it is difficult to borrow. . . . So it might be infeasi-
ble for the husband to raise the money necessary to buy back from the wife, in a lump
sum, as much of the asset as she can fairly claim is hers by virtue of her contribu-
tions; instead he must pay her over time out of the stream of earnings that the asset
generates.51
Marriages of long duration are particularly susceptible to alimony because
of lost economic opportunities.  The “reliance theory” rationale is grounded in
47 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS §5.04 cmt. b, at 807 (2002).
48 Collins, supra note 5, at 43.
49 Collins, supra note 5, at 43-44 (quoting Delozier v. Delozier, 640 A.2d 55, 57-58 (Vt.
1994)).  Additionally, as in many states, Nevada alimony cannot be predicated upon marital
fault or breach of the marital contract. See generally Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d
200 (Nev. 1997).  Alimony has been described as the receipt of “work in progress” profits
similar to income payable to a former partner after a partnership has dissolved. Id. at 49.
50 See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:  THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 61 (1985).
51 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 151 (7th ed. 2007); see also Diana
Green Smith, ‘Til Success Do Us Part:  How Illinois Promotes Inequities in Property Distri-
bution Pursuant to Divorce by Excluding Professional Goodwill, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
147, 163-65 (1992).
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economic loss, but expanded by the passage of time.52  Spouses make certain
investments and decisions in reliance upon the continuation of marriage.  They
make decisions they would not otherwise make if they were unmarried.  The
longer the marriage, the greater the spouses rely upon the continuation of mar-
riage—with its attendant economic benefits.  The longer a spouse relies upon
marriage, the greater her risks of economic injustice upon divorce.  As
explained by two scholars:
First, the longer the marriage, the more likely the parties are to have foregone oppor-
tunities to enter into other favorable marriages.  Second, in cases where career sacri-
fices are involved, the longer the marriage, the less likely the sacrificing spouse will
be able to resume the interrupted career.  Third, the longer the marriage and the
greater the disparity in income, the more likely an increase in earning capacity
occurred during the marriage, due (at least to some degree) to the contributions of the
supporting spouse.53
Legal economists view the family as a consuming and producing unit in
society.54  The family unit’s economic properties can therefore be quantified
and valued.55  The family firm buys inputs of market commodities while pro-
ducing outputs of “nourishment, warmth, affection, children, and the other tan-
gible and intangible goods . . . .”56  Rational individuals make choices by
reference to costs and benefits.  If each spouse equally participates in care work
and wage work, “the marriage will be less ‘profitable.’”57  “The theory of com-
parative advantage implies that the resources of members of a household . . .
should be allocated to various activities according to their comparative or rela-
tive efficiencies.”58  Therefore, one spouse specializes in income production
while the other spouse specializes in household production (even though the
latter spouse may also work outside the home for financial compensation).59
Spouses maximize the family profits by making these marital sharing
choices.60
The economic consequences of specialization under a traditional utility
maximization theory become apparent upon divorce.  “Human capital is the
52 Spillane, supra note 7, at 288.
53 Collins, supra note 5 at 53 (quoting Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance
Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, n.151 (1988)); see also AM. LAW
INST., supra note 47, §5.02 cmt. f, at 792.
54 POSNER, supra note 51, at 143.
55 This analysis may be problematic because market valuation “excludes . . . constraints of
social roles and inequalities based upon gender, race, and class.”  Gaytri Kachroo, Mapping
Alimony:  From Status to Contract and Beyond, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 163, 164 (2007).
56 POSNER, supra note 51, at 143.
57 Kachroo, supra note 55, at 182; see also POSNER, supra note 51, at 144 (“By specializing
in household production, the wife maximizes the value of her time as an input into the
production of the household’s overall output.  This division of labor tends to maximize the
total real income of the household by enabling husband and wife to specialize in comple-
mentary activities.  It is the same principle that leads us to expect a person who works half-
time as a doctor and half-time as a lawyer to produce less than one-half the total output of
medical and legal services of two people of equal ability to his, one of whom is a full-time
doctor and the other a full-time lawyer.”).
58 Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 366 (2007).
59 Kachroo, supra note 55, at 219.
60 Id. at 182.
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ability to earn a stream of income over a lifetime.”61  Human capital is an asset.
Individuals invest in their human capital through education and work experi-
ence.62  Specialization in household labor may cause decreased human capital
through lack of ongoing training and employment opportunities.  In traditional
marriages, where specialization of labor occurs, the care worker’s human capi-
tal diminishes while the wage worker’s human capital increases.  During mar-
riage, the specialization is mutually advantageous to both parties.  Upon
divorce, however, the wage worker takes his increased human capital into his
post-marriage future while the care worker leaves the marriage with diminished
capital and a decreased earning ability.
Legal economists propose that the rational basis for alimony is compensa-
tion for the opportunity cost in the form of decreased earning capacity that
results from one spouse’s care work during the marriage.63  In other words,
alimony is calculated by prices imposed and costs allocated to care work—as if
the care work spouse were the employee of the wage work spouse.  The value
of the alimony claim is the value of the lost earning capacity realized through
the loss of the mutual effort to maximize income.64  Additionally, the value of
love and companionship is measured by the doctrine of altruism, which is pri-
marily advanced by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker.65
Several scholars criticize the law and economics approach to alimony
law.66  These critics argue the distinction between positive and normative eco-
nomic theories is difficult to sustain when describing intimate human relation-
ships.67  Legal economists have a “tendency to mix normative judgments
liberally in . . . positive analysis.”68  Positive economists fail to acknowledge
that family behavior cannot be valued in money, and the “heavily mathemati-
cal” analysis may be “sterile, incomplete, and even inaccurate.”69  According to
one scholar, this social reality creates problems for all but the most theoretical
legal economists.70  Additionally, feminist theory critics argue gender-based
divisions of labor are traceable not only to shared utility, but also to issues of
power and socially-imposed inequality.71
Despite its criticisms, the language of law and economics has led to a
significant proposal for alimony reform.  A seminal reference point for the eco-
nomic loss rationale is found with the efforts of the American Law Institute
(ALI).  The ALI devoted eleven years to developing an alimony formula
61 Spillane, supra note 7, at 288; see also STEPHEN J. SPURR, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
LAW 27 (2006).
62 Spillane, supra note 7, at 288.
63 Id.
64 Kachroo, supra note 55, at 182.
65 Tsoukala, supra note 58, at 365 (noting Becker’s argument that altruism leads to coordi-
nated, utilitarian behavior).
66 See generally id.
67 Kachroo, supra note 55.
68 Id. at 201.
69 Tsoukala, supra note 58, at 370 (quoting Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A
Feminist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-5 (1996)); Kachroo, supra note 55, at 200.
70 Kachroo, supra note 55, at 200.
71 Id. at 164, 201.
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intended to increase predictability and decrease judicial discretion.72  The Prin-
ciples of the Law of Family Dissolution (the “Principles”) transform alimony
from need-based awards into entitlement-based compensation for specific eco-
nomic losses caused by divorce.73  Although the ALI approved the Principles
in 1997, no state has yet to formally adopt the Principles.74
Under the Principles, a presumption for post-marriage compensation arises
if a spouse:  1) suffered a loss of the marital living standard in a marriage of
significant duration; 2) suffered a loss in earning capacity incurred by primary
care responsibilities for children; 3) suffered a loss in earning capacity resulting
from the care of a sick, elderly or disabled third party to whom a moral obliga-
tion is owed; 4) required reimbursement for contributions to the other spouse’s
education or training in short-term marriages; and 5) required money to restore
her premarital living standard.75  The amount of the award is measured by cal-
culating the spouses’ income disparity and multiplying that figure by a dura-
tional factor.76  Under the Principles, courts preserve judicial discretion to
prevent “substantial injustice.”77
A recurring point of contention among alimony scholars is the termination
of alimony upon cohabitation or remarriage.  The Principles provide that ali-
mony may cease upon either of these two events.78  Several scholars criticize
this approach, arguing that alimony based upon economic entitlement should
not be affected by post-marriage economic events.79  As argued by one scholar,
[i]f alimony is an entitlement based on gender-neutral principles, it is difficult to
explain why a wife must forfeit that entitlement simply because she has begun a new
life relationship.  Even if she wins the lottery, a dissociated partner need not return
her buyout; a creditor need not cancel a debt; a tort victim need not give back her
damage award.80
The Principles have been both criticized and endorsed.81  However, the
Principles also embody many of the contemporary rationales for alimony and
articulate policies that are implicit in Nevada law.  Within this contextual back-
ground, alimony based upon economic loss, or as an adjunct to property divi-
sion, appears viable under Nevada law.  Alimony based upon a reliance theory
72 AM. LAW INST., supra note 47, § 5.02, at 787; David Westfall, Unprincipled Family
Dissolution:  The American Law Institute’s Recommendations for Spousal Support and Divi-
sion of Property, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 917, 918 (2004).
73 AM. LAW INST., supra note 47, § 5.02 cmt. a, at 788; Tonya L. Brito, Spousal Support
Takes on the Mommy Track:  Why the ALI Proposal is Good for Working Mothers, 8 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 151, 152 (2001).
74 Elijah L. Milne, Recharacterizing Separate Property at Divorce, 84 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 307, 317 (2007).
75 See generally AM. LAW INST., supra note 47, §§ 5.02-.05, at 787-834, § 5.11, at 886,
§ 5.13, at 896.
76 Brito, supra note 73, at 152; McCoy, supra note 8, at 509; Tsaoussis, supra note 46, at
227.
77 AM. LAW INST., supra note 47, § 1.02, at 88 (noting that judges must make written find-
ings when departing from the presumption).
78 Id. §§ 5.07-.09, at 859-75.
79 Cynthia Lee Starnes, One More Time:  Alimony, Intuition, and the Remarriage-Termina-
tion Rule, 81 IND. L.J. 971, 992 (2006).
80 Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 51, at 151.
81 See McCoy, supra note 8; Westfall, supra note 72; Kapalla, supra note 16.
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of marriage continuation for long-term marriages also appears to be a viable
Nevada rationale.
III. NEVADA STATUTORY ALIMONY
A. History of Nevada Statutory Alimony
The Territorial Legislature promulgated the Act Relating to Marriage and
Divorce in 1861.82  It provided that, if a marriage was dissolved for adultery,
the wife should receive the husband’s lands and property as if he were
deceased.83  If the marriage was dissolved for other causes, the Court could set
apart such portion for the wife’s support as deemed “just and equitable.”84  The
Nevada Legislature adopted this same language during its first session in
1865.85  Reminiscent of coverture, the legislature also directed that “[t]he hus-
band shall have the management and control of the separate property of the
wife during the continuation of the marriage . . . .”86
In 1913, the Nevada Legislature authorized “permanent support and main-
tenance” if the wife had cause for divorce or was abandoned by her husband for
more than ninety days.87  In 1915, the Legislature authorized the courts, upon a
wife’s remarriage, to direct the payment of alimony “for the benefit of the
minor children.”88  In 1939, the Legislature amended the “just and equitable”
standard to include an analysis of “the respective merits of the parties and to the
condition in which they will be left by such divorce . . . .”89  The Legislature
also made alimony terminable by death or remarriage unless “otherwise
ordered by the court.”90
In 1993, the Nevada Legislature eliminated the “respective merits of the
parties” and the “condition in which they will be left by the divorce” considera-
tions.91  The alimony statute now provides that courts may award alimony in a
specified principal sum or as specified periodic payments as appears “just and
equitable.”92  Periodic alimony payments cease upon death or remarriage,
unless otherwise ordered by the court.93  Courts may modify alimony payments
not yet accrued upon a showing of changed circumstances.94
82 Act of Nov. 28, 1861, ch. 24, 1861 Nev. Stat. 70-71.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Act of Mar. 7, 1865, ch. 76, 1864-5 Nev. Stat. 239.
86 Id.
87 Act of Mar. 13, 1913, ch. 97, 1912 Nev. Stat. 120.
88 Act of Mar. 24, 1915, ch. 211, 1915 Nev. Stat. 324.
89 Act of Feb. 23, 1939, ch. 25, 1939 Nev. Stat. 18.
90 Id. at 18-19.
91 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415, 417 n.4 (Nev. 2000).
92 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(1)(a) (2007).
93 Id. § 125.150(5).  The Supreme Court has adopted a bright-line rule for remarriage. See
Shank v. Shank, 691 P.2d 872, 873 (Nev. 1984) (holding that the re-marriage ceremony is
enough to terminate alimony—even if the re-marriage is void and subsequently annulled).
94 § 125.150(7).
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B. Nevada Statutory Guidelines
Until 2007, Nevada was one of only ten states in the country without some
form of statutory guidelines to inform the alimony decision.95  No state ranks
the statutory guidelines’ significance or weight.96  The result is that “‘[b]oth
the trial and appellate courts look to a hodgepodge of factors, weighing them in
an unspecified and unsystematic fashion,’ rendering it impossible for couples
or their counsel to predict with any degree of certainty what the actual alimony
award might or should be.”97
Statutory guidelines generally follow two approaches.  The first is an
attempt to determine the recipient spouse’s financial needs regardless of what
contributions she may have made during the marriage.98  The second is an
attempt to reward the recipient spouse’s economic and personal contributions to
the marriage, such as “the investments of time, money or effort in the relation-
ship itself, or in its financial health.”99
The 2007 Nevada Legislature codified eleven guidelines, which were
taken directly from decisional authority published by the Nevada Supreme
Court.100  No legislative history examines the substance of the guidelines or
provides insight into how courts should measure, balance or otherwise apply
the guidelines.101  The newly-enacted guidelines follow the approaches
described in the preceding paragraph.  Nevada courts must now consider,
among any other relevant considerations, the following guidelines when deter-
mining alimony:
1. The financial condition of each spouse.  This guideline focuses on the recipient’s
need and the payor’s ability to pay.102
2. The nature and value of the respective property of each spouse.  This guideline
focuses on the recipient’s need and the payor’s ability to pay.103
3. The contribution of each spouse to any property held by the spouses pursuant to
section 123.030 of the Nevada Revised Statutes.104  This guideline focuses on the
95 Collins, supra note 5, at 32; McCoy, supra note 8, at 514 n.112.
96 Collins, supra note 5, at 32.
97 Id. at 32-33 (alteration in original) (quoting Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi
Rents; Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 276 (1987)).
98 Id. at 36.
99 Id.
100 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(8) (2007).
101 The explanatory language provided by the Nevada Legislative Council Bureau merely
indicates that
Under existing case law in Nevada, a court determining whether alimony should be awarded
and the appropriate amount of alimony is required to consider several relevant factors including:
(1) the financial condition of the parties; (2) the nature and value of their respective property; (3)
the contribution of each party to any property held by both parties as tenants by the entirety; (4)
the duration of the marriage; and (5) the income, earning capacity, age and health of each party.
Section 1 of this bill codifies those factors as well as factors from subsequent case law so that a
court must consider those factors when determining alimony.
Act of June 13, 2007, ch. 465, 2007 Nev. Stat. 2479 (citations omitted).
102 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(8)(a) (2007).
103 Id. § 125.150(8)(b).
104 Id. § 123.030 (“A husband and wife may hold real or personal property as joint tenants,
tenants in common, or as community property.”).
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spouses’ respective financial conditions and is therefore an extension of the need and
ability to pay considerations.105
4. The duration of marriage.  This guideline focuses on the reliance theory of mar-
riage continuation.106
5. The income, earning capacity, age and health of each spouse.  This guideline
focuses on the recipient’s need, the payor’s ability to pay, the payor’s career asset,
and the reliance theory of marriage continuation.107
6. The standard of living during the marriage.  This guideline focuses on the reli-
ance theory of marriage continuation.108
7. The career before the marriage of the spouse who would receive the alimony.
This guideline focuses on the recipient’s economic loss resulting from career
subordination.109
8. The existence of specialized education or training or the level of marketable
skills attained by each spouse during the marriage.  This guideline focuses on the
career asset as an adjunct to property division and economic loss resulting from
career subordination.110
9. The contribution of either spouse as homemaker.  This guideline focuses on eco-
nomic loss resulting from career subordination.111
10. The award of property granted by the court in the divorce, other than child
support and alimony, to the spouse who would receive the alimony.  This guideline
focuses on the recipient’s need.112
11. The physical and mental condition of each party as it relates to the financial
condition, health and ability to work of that spouse.  This guideline focuses on the
recipient’s need and the payor’s ability to pay.113
C. Nevada Rehabilitative Alimony
In addition to other alimony, Nevada courts must consider whether reha-
bilitative alimony is appropriate.  Rehabilitative alimony is intended to assist
the recipient spouse obtain training or education relating to a job, career, or
profession.114  In addition to other relevant factors, courts shall consider:
1. Whether the spouse who would pay alimony has obtained greater job skills or
education during the marriage; and
105 Id. § 125.150(8)(c).
106 Id. § 125.150(8)(d).
107 Id. § 125.150(8)(e).
108 Id. § 125.150(8)(f).
109 Id. § 125.150(8)(g).
110 Id. § 125.150(8)(h).
111 Id. § 125.150(8)(i).
112 Id. § 125.150(8)(j).
113 Id. § 125.150(8)(k).
114 Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 581 P.2d 860, 862 (Nev. 1978) (“It is clear that the two year
award was in the nature of ‘rehabilitative alimony’, awarded wives for the purpose of facili-
tating their entry into the labor market.”)
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2. Whether the spouse who would receive such alimony provided financial support
while the other spouse obtained job skills or education.115
The Nevada Legislature created rehabilitative alimony, among other rea-
sons, to increase the workforce and keep the recipient spouses off the welfare
rolls.116  The factors indicate that rehabilitative alimony is also intended to
compensate for losses incurred by career subordination to the predomination of
the other spouse’s career asset.
D. Statutory Division of Marital Estate
Alimony as an adjunct to property division compels a brief examination of
Nevada’s marital property distribution scheme.  In 1993, the Nevada Legisla-
ture changed Nevada’s property division law from equitable division to equal
division.117  Nevada courts must now, to the extent practicable, divide the mari-
tal estate equally without regard to the respective merits of the parties.118  Mar-
ital fault is not legally relevant.119  A court may divide the marital estate
unequally if there are compelling reasons to do so.120  In 1996 and 1997, the
Nevada Supreme Court published two decisions analyzing what may constitute
compelling reasons for unequal division.121  The focus of these decisions is
financial misconduct, primarily after separation.  The Court did note in dicta
that another compelling reason could be to compensate one spouse for losses
occasioned by marriage and its dissolution, such as reimbursement for support-
ing a spouse while he or she obtained a graduate degree.122  Thus, courts may
use property division to remedy the economic losses normally associated with
alimony.
IV. NEVADA DECISIONAL AUTHORITY
There are more than 300 Nevada Supreme Court published decisions con-
taining the word “alimony” in the text or editorial annotation.123  Upon careful
review, however, only a few decisions examine post-marriage alimony.  Of
those, there are even fewer that provide any overarching policy guidance
115 § 125.150(9).
116 Fondi v. Fondi, 802 P.2d 1264, 1268 n.5 (Nev. 1990).
117 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415, 417 & n.4 (Nev. 2000).
118 § 125.150(1)(b); Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997).
119 Wheeler, 946 P.2d at 203.
120 § 125.150(1)(b).
121 Putterman v. Putterman, 939 P.2d 1047, 1048 (Nev. 1997); Lofgren v. Lofgren, 926 P.2d
296, 297-98 (Nev. 1996).
122 Putterman, 939 P.2d at 1048.  The issue of graduate educations has spawned its own
literature. See generally In re Marriage of Weinstein, 470 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984);
In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989); Postema v. Postema, 471 N.W.2d
912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985); In re Mar-
riage of Denton, 951 P.2d 693 (Or. 1998); Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796 (Wis. 1984);
Katherine Wells Meighan, For Better or For Worse:  A Corporate Finance Approach to
Valuing Educational Degrees at Divorce, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 193 (1997); Daniel D.
Polsby & Martin Zelder, Risk-Adjusted Valuation of Professional Degrees in Divorce, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 273 (1994).
123 As of December 29, 2008, a Westlaw search with the key terms “alimony” or “spousal
support” returned 340 results.
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regarding alimony.  The decisions are difficult to categorize for several reasons.
First, they represent more than 120 years of jurisprudence—with evolving
social circumstances and rotating judicial personalities.  Second, the decisions
lack analytical consistency and are each informed by a trial judge’s individual
discretion.  On a few occasions, the Court has acted as a trier of fact, choosing
to impose its own judgment instead of remanding for further proceedings.124
Third, only seven decisions were published after the enactment of the 1993
equal division statute.125  The Court last published a substantive alimony deci-
sion in 2000.126  Fourth, the Court has historically entered a substantial number
of unpublished dispositive orders.  These orders are neither available for organ-
ized academic review nor may they be referred to for any precedential pur-
pose.127  Fifth, many of the decisions contain overlapping analyses and could
be placed within multiple categories.
For the purposes of this Article, the relevant Nevada Supreme Court deci-
sions are placed within one of the following policy categories:
1. Traditional need-based alimony and/or the payor’s ability to pay128
2. Non-specific economic loss
3. Adjunct to property division
4. Reliance theory of marriage continuation
In this Section, I discuss each of these policy categories, in turn.
A. Traditional Need-Based Alimony and/or the Payor’s Ability to Pay
There are twenty-eight decisions examining alimony based upon the recip-
ient spouse’s need and/or the payor spouse’s ability to pay.129  These decisions
span 114 years, dating from 1884 through 1998.  Many of these decisions are
interesting, but of little contemporary value because none explain why one
spouse must support a former spouse after the marriage has ended.  A summary
of the need-based decisions is included in Appendix A at the conclusion of this
Article.
The Nevada Supreme Court announced in its first substantive alimony
decision that after a divorce is finalized, the law shall impose “the duty of
supporting [the wife] according to [the husband’s] ability and condition in
life.”130  The Court published its last need-based decision in 1998.131  That
124 See Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645, 648 (Nev. 1994); Rutar v. Rutar, 827 P.2d 829,
833 (Nev. 1992).
125 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000); Wright v. Osburn, 970 P.2d 1071
(Nev. 1998); Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998); Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37
(Nev. 1998); Alba v. Alba, 892 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1995); Gardner, 881 P.2d 645; Sprenger v.
Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1994).
126 See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000), but see Williams v. Williams, 97
P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2004) (Although in the author’s view, not a “substantive” decision, held
that the putative spouse doctrine does not permit an alimony award if the marriage ends in
annulment).
127 NEV. SUP. CT. R. 123.
128 The ability to pay decisions are combined with the traditional need-based decisions
because they are incongruent with alimony as an entitlement resulting from economic loss.
129 See infra app. A.
130 Lake v. Lake, 4 P. 711, 730 (1884).
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decision does little to advance the concept of alimony as a form of economic
entitlement.  The Court noted the majority rule that cohabitation can lead to
modification or termination if the “recipient spouse’s need for the support
decreases as a result of the cohabitation.”132  The Court then adopted the fol-
lowing “economic needs” test:
[T]he amount of spousal support reduction, if any, depends upon a factual examina-
tion of the financial effects of the cohabitation on the recipient spouse.  Shared living
arrangements, unaccompanied by evidence of a decrease in the actual financial needs
of the recipient spouse, are generally insufficient to call for alimony modification.
The economic needs test properly considers the rights and needs, both fiscal and
personal, of payor and recipient spouses . . . .
. . . [T]he test also recognizes the fact that the recipient spouse may be left
largely unprotected, from an economic standpoint, if he or she breaks off a relation-
ship with the cohabitant.133
B. Non-Specific Economic Loss
There are four published decisions in which nonspecific economic loss can
be inferred as an analytical influence in the alimony decision.134  These deci-
sions are only marginally instructive, however, and only so by inference.  Two
decisions confirmed alimony and two decisions affirmed the denial of alimony.
A summary of the non-specific economic loss decisions is included in Appen-
dix B at the conclusion of this Article.
In Thorne v. Thorne,135 the Nevada Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that a
wife suffers economic loss if she does not receive a return on her investment
into the marriage endeavor by way of an alimony award.136  In Winn v.
Winn,137 the Court recognized that alimony can be used to compensate one
spouse for economic losses incurred in a short-term marriage.138  The decision
implies alimony can be used to return a spouse to her pre-marriage economic
condition.  In York v. York,139 the Court rejected the proposition that care work
is separately compensable through alimony.140  The Court noted:
It is generally recognized that the marital community is a partnership to which both
parties contribute.  Each spouse contributes his or her industry in order to further the
goals of the marriage.  There was evidence to show [the wife] labored for the benefit
of her marital relationship by performing household duties.  She fails, however, to
cite any authority for the proposition that such services are compensable upon
divorce.141
131 Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998).
132 Id. at 764.
133 Id. at 765 (citations omitted).  As noted by many scholars, alimony terminable by remar-
riage is incongruent with the concept of economic entitlement. See Starnes, supra note 79,
at 992; see also POSNER, supra note 51, at 151.
134 See infra app. B.
135 Thorne v. Thorne, 326 P.2d 729 (Nev. 1958).
136 Id. at 730.
137 Winn v. Winn, 467 P.2d 601 (Nev. 1970).
138 Id. at 602.
139 York v. York, 718 P.2d 670 (Nev. 1986).
140 Id. at 671.
141 Id.
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Finally, in Fondi v. Fondi,142 the Court examined a mid-length marriage
of sixteen years and concluded that alimony was not appropriate because:  1)
the claimant did not contribute to her husband’s career asset; 2) the claimant
remained employed throughout the marriage; 3) the parties had no children
together; and 4) the claimant did not need post-marriage support.143
C. Adjunct to Property Division
Beginning in 1988, the Nevada Supreme Court published four decisions in
which it focused on the payor spouse’s career asset built upon the contributions
of both spouses.144  A common analytical thread running through each decision
is the recipient spouse’s post-marriage economic need.  No decision contains a
clear analysis of entitlement independent of economic need.  These decisions
are instructive and are summarized in Appendix C at the conclusion of this
Article.
In Heim v. Heim,145 the husband obtained a Ph.D. degree and lucrative
university position during marriage.146  In contrast, the wife was a care worker
for six children throughout the marriage.147  The Court was
struck by the enormous disparity in the status and quality of life of the two marital
partners that is brought about largely by the ‘paltry’ amount of alimony awarded to
her by the trial court.  It is quite obvious that [he] leaves the divorce with almost
everything and [she] with almost nothing.  By ‘everything’ we mean principally [his]
present capacity (a capacity gained by him through the long-term efforts of both
parties) to hold a prestigious position and command a large salary.  Rather clearly,
the single most valuable product of the [parties’] enterprise in the marital partnership
is the Ph.D. degree and the high level of professional employability which were
gained by [him] during the marriage.”148
Under these circumstances, the Court held the wife was entitled to
“somefair return” based upon her contributions to the marital partnership.149
The case of Gardner v. Gardner150 involved spouses who were both edu-
cated and employed during marriage.151  The wife relocated several times with
the husband through several iterations of his pilot training and career.152  Each
time the spouses moved, the wife was forced to leave her employment and lose
seniority and retirement benefits.153  The Court reversed the trial court’s lim-
ited award of rehabilitative alimony, noting “[t]he magnitude of [her] contribu-
tion to the community over many years is not fairly recognized by the two-year
alimony award . . . .”154
142 Fondi v. Fondi, 802 P.2d 1264 (Nev. 1990).
143 Id. at 1269-70.
144 See infra app. C.
145 Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678 (Nev. 1988).
146 Id. at 678.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 681-82 (citations omitted).
149 Id. at 683.
150 Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645 (Nev. 1994).
151 Id. at 646.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 646-47
154 Id. at 648.
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In Wright v. Osburn,155 the parties both obtained college educations dur-
ing marriage.156  The wife was not employed as a wage worker after the birth
of the couple’s first child.157  The Court reversed an award of rehabilitative
alimony because the wife enabled the husband “to obtain an advanced degree
and establish a career.”158  As a result, the husband’s post-marriage economic
opportunities were greater than the wife’s post-marriage economic opportuni-
ties.159  The Court concluded it was unlikely the wife would be able to earn an
income that would enable her to either “maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed dur-
ing marriage or a lifestyle commensurate with, although not necessarily equal,
to that of [the husband’s].”160
Finally, in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,161 the Court noted the husband had
“risen steadily to a management position” and enjoyed a “far superior earning
power.”162  In contrast, the wife would be “impoverished as a result of
divorce.”163 Rodriguez was the Court’s last alimony decision, and is best
known for its holding that “[a]limony is not a sword to level the wrongdoer”164
and it “is not a prize to reward virtue.  Alimony is financial support paid from
one spouse to the other whenever justice and equity require it.”165
D. Reliance Theory for Lengthy Marriages
Beginning in 1978, the Nevada Supreme Court published five decisions in
which it concluded the length of marriage was the engine of alimony.166  The
marriages ranged from seventeen to twenty-one years.  A summary of the
Court’s decisions is available in Appendix D.  Three of the decisions reject
rehabilitative alimony as the remedy to economic injustice resulting from long-
term marriages, whereas one decision suggests that rehabilitative alimony could
be an adequate remedy.  As with other economic loss decisions, these decisions
are phrased within the context of the recipient spouse’s economic need.
In Johnson v. Steel, Incorporated,167 the Court provided its most thorough
analysis of the reliance theory.  The parties were married twenty years and their
two children were still minors at the time of divorce.168  The lower court
awarded rehabilitative alimony for two years and nominal monthly alimony
until the wife’s death or remarriage.169  The Court acknowledged the “legiti-
mate and healthy trend toward consideration of the wife’s ability to become
155 Wright v. Osburn, 970 P.2d 1071 (Nev. 1998).
156 Id. at 1071.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1072.
159 Id. at 1071-72.
160 Id. at 1072.
161 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000).
162 Id. at 420.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 419.
165 Id.
166 See infra app. D.
167 Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 581 P.2d 860 (Nev. 1978).
168 Id. at 861.
169 Id. at 862.
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self-supporting in the determination of alimony,” but then cited to a New York
decision as follows:
[I]n our zeal to correct what may have been inequitably burdensome ali-
mony arrangements and to recognize the selfhood of women as functioning,
independent persons, we would do injustice to the men and women we seek to
treat more equally if we ignored the facts of life.  A woman who, for historical
and personal reasons, and especially with the long concurrence of her husband,
chooses to make her contribution to a marriage by remaining at home to raise
the children of the union and who finds herself, after 23 years, alone with still-
growing children to rear, might be victimized rather than liberated by being
required to enter the working world.
. . . .
. . . ‘[W]here (a husband) has acquiesced in and benefited from her role as wife and
mother for 23 years, he may not now, for his own economic reasons, force her into a
different role without demonstrating that it has economic viability and that the chil-
dren will not suffer any detriment from it.’170
In Shydler v. Shydler,171 the Court referred to the husband’s career asset
as “business acumen” that enhanced his post-marriage economic condition.172
The Court held:
Alimony is an equitable award serving to meet the post-divorce needs and rights of
the former spouse . . . . [T]wo of the primary purposes of alimony, at least in mar-
riages of significant length, are to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce
earning capacities of the parties, and to allow the recipient spouse to live “as nearly
as fairly possible to the station in life [ ] enjoyed before the divorce.”  The individual
circumstances of each case will determine the appropriate amount and length of any
alimony award.173
The Shydler Court does not explain the legal principle on which it based
its decision.  Interestingly, the Court remanded the issue and noted that ali-
mony, “at least for a period of rehabilitation,”174 was appropriate.  The Court
also held that Nevada law does not require alimony to equalize post-marriage
salaries.175
V. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT NEVADA ALIMONY
Nevada law provides no consistently or coherently stated rationale for ali-
mony awards.  Nevada decisional and statutory law provide support for almost
any conceivable alimony decision.  As noted by a judge from another jurisdic-
tion, support for alimony “can be found in the cases for absolutely any argu-
170 Id. at 863 (citing Kay v. Kay, 339 N.E.2d 143, 147 (N.Y. 1975) (citations omitted)).
171 Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37 (Nev. 1998).
172 Id. at 39 (noting a court may consider the alimony award as an adjunct to property
division).
173 Id. at 40 (citing Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284, 287-88 (Nev. 1994) (citations
omitted)).
174 Id. at 41.
175 Id.
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ment or position one wants to pursue.”176  The same assertion could be made in
Nevada.  Nonetheless, as set forth below, some alimony trends are discernable.
A. Statutory Guidance
The 2007 statutory guidelines were derived from legal principles
announced by the Nevada Supreme Court during the last several decades.  The
guidelines reflect historical alimony considerations because the Court histori-
cally focused on need and ability to pay.177  The guidelines also suggest com-
pensation for economic losses resulting from career subordination, the
indivisibility of the career asset, and the dissolution of a long-term marriage.178
There is no known legislative history examining the guidelines, nor is there any
evidence the guidelines were filtered through any deliberative legislative pro-
cess.  Neither the legislation itself, nor its history, provides any insight for
implementation.  Thus, the guidelines may be more palliative than purpose
driven.  Although the guidelines are encouraging, particularly those that focus
on economic loss, they should be re-examined and re-stated to better assist
pretrial resolutions and adjudicatory decisions.
B. Need-based alimony is pervasive but trending downward
Nevada statutory and decisional authority contemplate alimony that is
somewhat related to the recipient spouse’s need, even if the need is broadly
defined to include the wife’s luxurious marital standard of living.  The Nevada
Supreme Court continues to refer to the recipient spouse’s need in its ostensible
economic loss decisions, but it has not confirmed need as the sole basis for
alimony since 1990.179  The Nevada authorities provide no explanation for why
a person should be compelled to support a former spouse after the marriage has
ended.  As stated by one leading alimony scholar:  “[J]ust because many
divorced women meet financial difficulties upon divorce is no reason to assume
that in some way the other former spouse should be liable for this financial
need rather than parents, other family, or society generally.”180  Resolving the
contemporary relevance of need-based awards becomes ever more urgent
because Nevada is an equal division community property state, without regard
to marital fault.181  Also, because need-based awards lack a compelling ratio-
nale, there are no criteria for the amount and duration of the award.182  Income
176 Sciarrino & Duke, supra note 39, at 70 (quoting Stansberry v. Stansberry, 1977 Okla.
Civ. App. LEXIS 154, at *7 (Okla. Civ. App. Sept. 20, 1977)).
177 See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
179 Daniel v. Baker, 794 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1990).  The Gilman decision was placed within the
traditional need-based category but it does not examine need as the basis for alimony; it
merely examines the role of need when considering changed circumstances. See Gilman v.
Gilman, 956 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998).
180 Kachroo, supra note 55, at 170 (quoting Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1989)). See also AM. LAW INST., supra note 47, § 5.02 cmt. a, at 789; Collins,
supra note 5, at 37-38 (“[I]f marriage is terminable at will, and marital support obligations
end upon divorce, what is the justification for imposing a continued financial relationship
upon the parties?”).
181 Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997).
182 Collins, supra note 5, at 24-25.
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and expenses are unpredictable, as are need and ability to pay.  Need-based
awards perpetuate the antiquated support for services construct, which many
feminist scholars have criticized.183  Alimony based upon need may also con-
tribute to post-marriage economic injustice because it is frequently denied to
claimants who are otherwise entitled to post-marriage compensation.184  Ali-
mony grounded solely upon economic need does not appear analytically sus-
tainable, nor does it help resolve the chaotic nature of alimony adjudications.
For these reasons, it is suggested that Nevada continue trending away from
need-based awards in lieu of economic-based compensation.
C. Economic loss alimony is trending upward
Under Nevada law, economic loss resulting from career subordination
may be cured by a disproportionate property division, rehabilitative alimony, or
permanent alimony.  Economic loss resulting from the indivisibility of the
payor spouse’s career asset may be cured by rehabilitative or permanent ali-
mony, but the published decisions suggest the return on career investment is
influenced by the recipient spouse’s economic needs.  Economic loss resulting
from reliance upon the continuation of marriage may be cured by permanent
alimony, but virtually every Nevada decision in this regard contains a compo-
nent of economic need.  The tools for better alimony awards nominally exist,
but they come without an all-encompassing instruction manual.  The concept of
alimony as an entitlement based upon economic loss should dominate in future
legislation and decisional authorities.185
D. Methodology of Proof
The method for proving economic loss is an important component of the
recipient spouse’s case-in-chief.  There are no Nevada published decisions
examining how such losses may or should be proven.  A brief examination of
loss caused by career subordination illustrates the need for methodological
proof.  Income parity is an elusive ideal because income is driven by profes-
sion, ambition, sacrifice, and fortuity.  Different careers obviously result in dif-
ferent compensation schemes.  Therefore, career subordination is best
understood within a career-specific context.  The recipient spouse’s career
could be viewed longitudinally.  The recipient spouse should be prepared to
prove, by expert witness evidence if necessary, what she would earn if she had
been employed during marriage, without any employment costs associated with
care work or other marital distractions.  The recipient spouse should also be
prepared to demonstate how the proven loss may be remedied (i.e., amount and
duration of alimony, together with inflation and present value considerations).
Similarly, expert economic evidence can be used to prove the value of the
payor spouse’s career asset.  Many spouses will bring a career asset into the
183 Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”:  Reconsidering the Duty of Support and
Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2003).
184 Kachroo, supra note 55, at 165-69.
185 Additionally, if alimony is viewed as an economic entitlement, care workers will be
secure in their post-marriage affairs and spouses will continue making efficient marital shar-
ing choices.
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marriage through pre-marriage education, employment, or experience.  The
recipient spouse should present evidence regarding the value of the career asset
before marriage, the career asset grown during marriage, and the career asset to
be further developed with post-marriage efforts.186  One scholar has argued that
alimony predicated upon the career asset must reflect the elasticity of the post-
divorce career.187  The career asset generates ever-diminishing residuals as the
employed spouse’s post-divorce efforts supplant the marital efforts of both
spouses.188  The absence of such expert economic evidence compromises the
courts’ ability to render consistent and accurate decisions.
E. Other Considerations
The demographics of age are shifting as elderly Americans are living
longer.189  Nevada authorities provide no guidance regarding alimony for eld-
erly divorce litigants whose marriages cannot be considered long term.  Most
careers are terminable by age and careers are not readily transferable upon
retirement.190  Thus, each career asset should be considered within its appropri-
ate length expectancy.  Must a payor spouse be compelled to keep his career
asset active to sustain an alimony award?  Must an economically-superior
retired spouse pay alimony from the fruits of pre-marriage labor when the mar-
riage was not long term?  Nevada provides no answers to these questions.
Another unexamined issue is the propriety of alimony for high-wealth liti-
gants.  The equal division of marital property in these circumstances may ame-
liorate alimony.191  Again, Nevada provides no answer.  Nevada policymakers
should consider this issue when they revisit the nature and scope of alimony.
186 See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718 (N.Y. 1985).
187 Collins, supra note 5, at 63.
188 Id.
189 Individual Americans are living longer, and a greater proportion of Americans within the
aggregate population are growing elderly. ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS:  2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://
assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/profile_2005.pdf.  Seventy-eight million “baby boomers”
were born between 1946 and 1964.  Approximately 8000 Americans reach their sixtieth
birthday every day.  Lenita Powers, Baby Boomers Changing the Way We Look at Growing
Old, RENO GAZETTE-J., Apr. 4, 2006, at 1.  The United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Administration on Aging, reports there were 3.1 million Americans over
the age of sixty-five in 1900, 33.2 million in 1994, and 36.3 million in 2004.  The number of
Americans over the age of sixty-five  will almost double to 71.5 million by 2030. ERICA F.
WOOD, NAT’L CTR, ON ELDER ABUSE, STATE-LEVEL ADULT GUARDIANSHIP DATA:  AN
EXPLORATORY SURVEY 10 (2006).  The average life expectancy for older Americans is also
increasing.  While there were 4.2 million Americans over the age of eighty-five in 2000,
there will be 9.6 million Americans over the age of eighty-five in 2030.
190 The Social Security Administration has determined eligibility ages for retirement bene-
fits. ADMIN. ON AGING, supra note 189, at 1.
191 Judge Posner suggests equal division is arbitrary for “superrich” parties who acquired
their wealth during marriage.  The value of services contributed by the economically-inferior
spouse, when compared to what the economically-superior spouse would pay at arm’s length
for such services, is not close to market equilibrium.  The market benchmark in these cases
would be a retrospective analysis of what the parties would have agreed to in a prenuptial
agreement regarding unexpected financial success. POSNER, supra note 51, at 150-51.  The
issues of income generation and imputation, along with the sanctity of capital preservation
also become relevant for high-wealth litigants. See William H. Stolberg & Jane Hawkins,
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F. Continuation of Judicial Discretion
As an alimony decision-maker, it is difficult to contemplate a forum with-
out judicial discretion.  The alimony decision is predicated upon an infinite
variety of facts and familial dynamics.  Unlike child support, which as a policy
is unequivocal and somewhat limited, alimony is more resistant to quantitative
or qualitative, result-driven formulae.  The fact of marriage does not establish
the alimony obligation, whereas the fact of parenthood does establish a child
support obligation.  While discretion should continue to inform the alimony
decision, Nevada trial courts would benefit from a more thorough analysis of
the purpose and scope of Nevada alimony.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although economic loss is identified in Nevada law as a sustainable ratio-
nale, this Article does not join the surfeit of national scholarship examining the
intellectual and philosophical underpinnings of alimony.  Rather, this Article
synthesizes existing Nevada law and urges a re-examination of why and how
courts should award alimony.  Without policymaker assistance, trial courts will
continue entering disparate alimony awards and litigants will continue to bene-
fit or suffer from the vagaries of judicial personality.
Alimony for the Heiress? Imputing Income to Assets, FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 2005, at 54, 57.
Nevada authorities have yet to examine these issues.
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APPENDIX A
Traditional Need-Based Alimony and/or the Payor’s Ability to Pay
1. Lake v. Bender, 7 P. 74 (Nev. 1885).192  The Nevada Supreme Court
announced in its first substantive alimony decision that “[a]fter divorce is
granted to plaintiff the law imposes upon defendant the duty of supporting her
according to his ability and condition in life.”193  Although the holding is
phrased within a traditional needs context, the decision demonstrates the
Court’s progressive understanding of a wife’s compensable contributions to the
marriage.
Myron and Jane Lake were married in 1864 when Ms. Lake was a twenty-
six year old widow and mother of three children.194  Ms. Lake did not own any
property before the marriage, whereas Mr. Lake was already wealthy by the
time of the marriage.195  In 1862, before marriage, Mr. Lake obtained a charter
from the Nevada Territorial Legislature to build a toll road and bridge in what
is now the City of Reno.196  At the time, Reno was known as “Lake’s Cross-
ing.”197  Mr. Lake also owned and operated a hotel.198  Mr. Lake made sub-
stantial money from those enterprises and later sold a large tract of land to the
Central Pacific Railroad.199
Mr. and Ms. Lake had one child together.200  At the time of divorce, the
district court confirmed that all of Mr. Lake’s property was his pre-marriage,
separate property.201  Ms. Lake was forty-seven years of age at the time of their
divorce.202  The district court awarded $150.00 per month to Ms. Lake for as
long as she remained unmarried.203  Ms. Lake
had no property, but for more than 15 years she worked hard and performed faith-
fully the duties of a wife.  When she married Lake she was strong and healthy, but at
the time of the trial she testified that the hard work she had done had prematurely
enfeebled and aged her.204
Ms. Lake had “contributed her services and co-operated with him in the
manifold enterprises undertaken by him.  Early and late she toiled for him, year
in and year out.”205  The Court concluded that “she [was] entitled, at least, to
192 The Supreme Court reviewed the case four times.  The first appeal was procedurally
deficient because a final judgment had not been entered.  Lake v. King, 16 Nev. 215 (1881).
The second appeal confirmed the award of alimony pendent lite.  Lake v. Lake, 16 Nev. 363
(1882).  The third appeal challenged the district court’s characterization of all martial prop-
erty as the husband’s separate property.  Lake v. Lake, 30 P. 878, 878-79 (Nev. 1882).
193 Lake v. Lake 4 P. 711, 730 (Nev. 1884).
194 Lake v. Bender, 7 P. 74, 79 (Nev. 1885).
195 Id.
196 Patty Cafferata, Reno History:  Three Men Can Be Credited as City’s Founding Fathers,
RENO GAZETTE-J., Nov. 26, 2007, at 3E.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Lake v. Bender, 7 P. 74, 79 (Nev. 1885).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 74.
204 Id. at 79.
205 Id.
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be as well supported during the remainder of her life, as she ought to have
been, and was, prior to her application for divorce.”206  The Court defined sup-
port as a “word of broad signification; it includes everything—necessities and
luxuries—which a person in appellant’s positions is entitled to have and
enjoy.”207  The Court concluded,
[i]t is impossible to lay down a rule that should govern courts in cases like this,
except that they should consider all the circumstances surrounding the parties, includ-
ing, besides those mentioned in the statute, the financial condition of the husband and
the requirements of the wife; and, to the extent of her support, she should not be left
to suffer pecuniarily for having been compelled, by his ill conduct, to seek
divorce.208
2. Greinstein v. Greinstein, 191 P. 1082 (Nev. 1920).  The Nevada Supreme
Court concluded that alimony was properly awarded when the wife “was with-
out sufficient means, and unable physically to maintain and support herself, and
the husband was financially able to pay[.]”209
3. Foy v. Smith’s Estate, 81 P.2d 1065 (Nev. 1938).  The parties were mar-
ried twenty-five years.210  The district court awarded alimony to the wife in the
amount of $600.00 per month.211  The wife contended that her husband could
afford to pay more because he had understated his income during the divorce
proceeding.212  The Supreme Court focused on the wife’s needs:  “If it be true
that the defendant misrepresented his wealth to the plaintiff, as contended, it
would in no way affect this case.  If he had been worth a billion dollars, all that
the plaintiff would have been entitled to would have been support during her
life.”213  The Court held that support should not be ordered with “the idea of
enabling her to accumulate great wealth from such allowance.”214  The Court
also approved language from other jurisdictions, concluding that alimony is
“solely for the support and maintenance of the wife.”215
4. Murphy v. Murphy, 183 P.2d 632 (Nev. 1947).  The Nevada Supreme
Court noted that “one of the principal factors, if not the principal one, entering
into the problem of a reasonable determination of the amount of alimony a
husband should pay, is the extent or measure of his financial ability.”216
5. Wilson v. Wilson, 212 P.2d 1066 (Nev. 1949).  The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed a combined alimony and child support award.  Although the
206 Id.
207 Id. at 78.
208 Id. at 80.
209 Greinstein v. Greinstein, 191 P. 1082, 1082 (Nev. 1920).
210 Foy v. Smith’s Estate, 81 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Nev. 1938).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1067.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1068 (quoting Faversham v. Faversham, 161 A.D. 521, 523 (N.Y. App. Div.
1914)).
216 Murphy v. Murphy, 183 P.2d 632, 638 (Nev. 1947).
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wife was accustomed to receiving more money during marriage, the amount
awarded was consistent with the husband’s ability to pay.217
6. Lewis v. Lewis, 289 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1955).  The Supreme Court did not
analyze the wife’s need; rather, it focused entirely upon the husband’s ability to
pay.218
7. Fausone v. Fausone, 338 P.2d 68 (Nev. 1959).  The parties were married
for nineteen years.219  The wife was fifty-six and the husband was forty-eight
years of age at trial.220  The wife was in poor health and suffered from severe
degenerative arthritis.221  She had an eighth grade education and no employ-
ment prospects.222  She had not worked during the marriage.223  She was in
debt and had no sources of income other than the “charity of friends and rela-
tives.”224  The husband earned $4,500.00 per year.225  The district court denied
alimony as follows:
There is no reason in the world why a man should support a woman, unless she has
something obligating her such as with the care and support of children, why he
should have to support her any more than I should support him because he needs it.
If he has imposed obligations on her as a result of her marriage, she has suffered an
illness, or become disabled during her life with him, then she is entitled to alimony.  I
can see no other reason.  A woman is not entitled to alimony just because she has
been his wife.226
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the decision.227  The Court held that,
“[u]nder such a situation the necessities of the wife for her support and the
ability of the husband to contribute a reasonable sum definitely appear.”228
The Court went on to state that, “[w]hile we agree with the court’s conclusion
that ‘a woman is not entitled to alimony just because she has been his wife,’ we
cannot agree with the court’s other conclusion that she is not entitled to
support.”229
8. Baker v. Baker, 350 P.2d 140 (Nev. 1960).  The parties were married thir-
teen years.230  The district court did not award alimony, although it ordered the
husband to give his one-half interest in the joint tenancy home to his wife.231
The Nevada Supreme Court provided no other factual information.  The Court
217 Wilson v. Wilson, 212 P.2d 1066, 1074 (Nev. 1949).
218 Lewis v. Lewis, 289 P.2d 414, 417 (Nev. 1955).
219 Fausone v. Fausone, 338 P.2d 68, 71 (Nev. 1959).
220 Id. at 70.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 71.
226 Id. at 69 (quoting the district court opinion).
227 Id. at 71.
228 Id.
229 Id.  This decision could also be placed within one of the economic compensatory
categories.
230 Baker v. Baker, 350 P.2d 140, 140, 142 (Nev. 1960).
231 Id. at 140.
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merely affirmed the trial court’s discretionary decision.232  Although not a true
alimony decision, this case is included because it reflects the Court’s post-mar-
riage support considerations.
9. Freeman v. Freeman, 378 P.2d 264 (Nev. 1963).  The parties were married
for one year.233  They had a newborn child at the time of divorce.234  The wife
worked before marriage and had intended to work when the child reached two
years of age.235  The Nevada Supreme Court determined there was no alimony
as a matter of right.236  The Court discussed as follows:
Permanent alimony in conjunction with an absolute divorce was entirely unknown to
either the common law or the ecclesiastical law.  There is no such thing as a com-
mon-law power to grant permanent alimony in connection with a divorce.  The power
to award permanent alimony is wholly the creature of statute.237
The Court further noted a district court is not compelled to make any
award of alimony.238  The Court did not include information about the wife’s
needs or the husband’s ability to pay.  However, the Court did note in affirming
the lower court’s decision, the wife had worked and would continue to work,
which suggests that her absence of any need justified the denial of alimony.239
10. Adler v. Adler, 394 P.2d 350 (Nev. 1964).  The parties were married six
years.240  They did not have children.241  The wife was thirty-two years of age
at the time of the divorce.242  The husband was ordered to pay alimony in the
amount of $130.00 per week.243  At the time, he was earning $22,500.00 per
year and owned investments worth $400,000.00.244  Ten years later, the hus-
band moved to modify the alimony award based upon change in his employ-
ment circumstances.245  The Nevada Supreme Court noted the husband
continued to enjoy a high standard of living.246  The Court also noted the wife
had never remarried and was living in a meager apartment.247  She was a col-
lege graduate with a master’s degree, but she suffered from physical limitations
that compromised her ability to work.248  The husband’s wealth at the time of
the post-divorce hearing was similar to his wealth at trial.249  The Court
affirmed the district court’s decision to deny modification.250
232 Id. at 142.
233 Freeman v. Freeman, 378 P.2d 264, 265 (Nev. 1963).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 266.
236 Id. at 265.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 266.
239 Id. at 265.
240 Adler v. Adler, 394 P.2d 350, 350 (Nev. 1964).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 351.
243 Id. at 350.
244 Id. at 350-51.
245 Id. at 350.
246 Id. at 351.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 352.
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11. Fox v. Fox, 401 P.2d 53 (Nev. 1965).  The parties were married twenty-
nine years.251  The wife received almost $100,000.00 of their community busi-
ness.252  The district court ordered the husband pay $1,000.00 per month to
satisfy the wife’s property interest.253  It also ordered the husband to pay
$100.00 per year in alimony.254  The district court analyzed the wife’s living
expenses and determined she could live on her own community property distri-
butions.255  The Nevada Supreme Court stated it would have ordered a higher
allowance for alimony, but yielded to the district court as the trier of fact.256
The Court affirmed the “meager”257 alimony award because of the wife’s incre-
mental receipt of her property share.258
12. Edwards v. Edwards, 419 P.2d 637 (Nev. 1966).  The district court
ordered the husband to pay alimony in the amount of $150.00 per month.259
Three years later, he moved to terminate alimony because his income had
decreased.260  Although the husband’s income had decreased, he had also
increased his consumer expenses by buying two cars on installment con-
tracts.261  The district court therefore denied the modification.262  The Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed, noting that although the wife was not working it was
unimpressed by the husband’s “evident lack of desire to cut his own family
expenses.”263
13. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 422 P.2d 1005 (Nev. 1967).  There are no details availa-
ble about the length of the marriage or the parties’ ages, other than the wife was
“advancing in years and declining in health.”264  The district court ordered the
husband to convey his interest in the joint tenancy home to the wife for her
“future support, maintenance and security.”265  No alimony was ordered.266
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, noting that, “[f]rom ‘time immemorial,’
[it had] affirmed the trial courts in their efforts to provide and protect the needs
of the wife or children who are the victims of divorce.”267
14. Morris v. Morris, 432 P.2d 1022 (Nev. 1967).  The parties were married
twenty-eight years.268  The wife did not plead any facts showing her need for
alimony or the husband’s ability to pay.269  The Nevada Supreme Court
251 Fox v. Fox, 401 P.2d 53, 54 (Nev. 1965).
252 Id. at 58.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 59.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Edwards v. Edwards, 419 P.2d 637, 637 (Nev. 1966).
260 Id. at 637-38.
261 Id. at 638.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Jacobs v. Jacobs, 422 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Nev. 1967).
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Morris v. Morris, 432 P.2d 1022, 1022 (Nev. 1967).
269 Id. at 1022-23.
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affirmed the denial of alimony because the wife’s failure to make “necessary
allegations” was fatal.270
15. Wicker v. Wicker, 451 P.2d 715 (Nev. 1969).  The parties were divorced
in Wisconsin and the husband was ordered to pay alimony.271  The length of
marriage is not discussed.  The husband moved to modify the award five years
later.272  Although his income had doubled, he had also remarried.273  The
Nevada Supreme Court noted the wife was impoverished and unable to
labor.274  By contrast, the husband could afford to continue paying alimony.275
The Court thereby held the husband’s remarriage was not a basis for
modification.276
16. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 471 P.2d 254 (Nev. 1970).  The parties were
married for twenty-four years.277  The district court ordered the husband to pay
$10.00 per month in alimony, based upon his unemployment at the time of the
divorce.278  The Nevada Supreme Court concluded alimony should be consis-
tent with the husband’s ability to pay, and district courts can impute such earn-
ing power if the husband is not fully employed.279
17. Thurston v. Thurston, 487 P.2d 342 (Nev. 1971).  The parties were mar-
ried for thirty-four years.280  The wife received $300,000.00 in the property
division, which was a disproportionate share of the community property.281
However, she did not receive alimony.282  The Nevada Supreme Court con-
cluded the district court’s decision was just and equitable because the award
was “capable of producing a substantial yearly income.”283  Implicit in the
Court’s decision is that the investment income was sufficient for the wife’s
needs.
18. Sargeant v. Sargeant, 495 P.2d 618 (Nev. 1972).  The parties were mar-
ried for twenty-eight years.284  The husband was twenty years older than the
wife.285  The husband was wealthy, whereas the wife had little wealth.286  The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a lump sum alimony award based upon the
270 Id. at 1023.
271 Wicker v. Wicker, 451 P.2d 715, 716 (Nev. 1969).
272 Id. at 717.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 471 P.2d 254, 255 (Nev. 1970).
278 Id.
279 Id. at 256.
280 Thurston v. Thurston, 487 P.2d 342, 343 (Nev. 1971).
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Sargeant v. Sargeant, 495 P.2d 618, 620 (Nev. 1972).
285 Id. at 622.
286 Id. at 620.
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wife’s life remaining expectancy of 23.1 years.287  The Court noted the purpose
of the award was to provide support for the wife.288
19. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 523 P.2d 1 (Nev. 1974).  This was the Nevada
Supreme Court’s first attempt to inform the alimony discretion with specific
considerations.  The parties were married five years at the time of trial and
were the parents of two minor children.289  The district court awarded monthly
property settlement payments, but denied alimony.290  The wife appealed, not-
ing that although the circumstances did not warrant long-term alimony some
alimony would allow her “to adjust to the situation.”291  The Nevada Supreme
Court acknowledged its earlier statement in Freeman that there is no entitle-
ment to alimony as a matter of right.292  It then held that the alimony discretion
is
neither arbitrary nor uncontrolled.  [Rather, m]uch depends upon the particular facts
of the individual case.  Among the matters to be considered are: the financial condi-
tion of the parties; the nature and value of their respective property; the contribution
of each to any property held by them as tenants by the entirety;293 the duration of the
marriage; the husband’s income, his earning capacity, his age, health and ability to
labor; and the wife’s age, health, station and ability to earn a living.294
Turning to the facts, the Court noted the marriage cohabitation was only
three years.  The wife was thirty-one years of age at trial.295  The wife was in
good health, even though she chose to work only one day per week.296  The
Court affirmed the denial of alimony, primarily because the wife was able to
provide for her own needs.297  The Court did note it would have affirmed an
award of alimony, if so ordered by the district court.298
20. Schulman v. Schulman, 558 P.2d 525 (Nev. 1976).  The parties were mar-
ried for five years.299  The husband was twenty-two years older than the
wife.300  The husband was wealthy, but the wife received little in the property
division.301  The district court awarded alimony of $1,000.00 per month for six
months.302  The opinion includes little discussion, but it does appear the Court
awarded nominal alimony to transition the wife back to her premarital standard
of living.
287 Id. at 621-22.
288 This decision could also be placed within the reliance theory category.
289 Buchanan v. Buchanan, 523 P.2d 1, 2 (Nev. 1974).
290 Id.
291 Id. at 4 (quoting Appellant’s Brief).
292 Id. (citing Freeman v. Freeman, 378 P.2d 264, 265 (Nev. 1963)).
293 This is curious inasmuch as tenants by the entirety is a form of tenancy unknown to
Nevada jurisprudence. See Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678, 680 (Nev. 1988).
294 Buchanan, 523 P.2d at 5.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Schulman v. Schulman, 558 P.2d 525, 526 (Nev. 1976).
300 Id. at 531.
301 Id. at 527-28.
302 Id. at 529
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21. Applebaum v. Applebaum, 566 P.2d 85 (Nev. 1977).  There were no fac-
tual details set forth in the decision, other than a reference to factual similarities
with Buchanan.  The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a denial of alimony.303
The Court simply noted the wife “had adequate resources with which to support
herself.”304
22. Jones v. Jones, 571 P.2d 103 (Nev. 1977).  The district court ordered the
husband to pay alimony for ten years, or until the wife’s death or remarriage.305
The parties had agreed alimony would cease upon cohabitation.306  The wife
subsequently cohabitated, and the district court terminated alimony.307  The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.308  This decision is included because cohabi-
tation affects the cohabitant’s need to be supported by a former spouse,
whereas cohabitation would not impair an economic recovery to which the
spouse is otherwise entitled.
23. Ellett v. Ellett, 573 P.2d 1179 (Nev. 1978).  The parties were married
twenty-eight years, but they had lived together for only eighteen years at the
time of their divorce.309  The husband was forty-eight years of age and the wife
was forty-seven years of age when divorce proceedings were commenced.310
The district court ordered the husband to pay alimony in the amount of $750.00
per month.311  The husband argued on appeal that the wife’s employability dis-
qualified her from alimony.312  The Nevada Supreme Court did not “address
that narrow issue”313 because evidence demonstrated the wife could not work
because of her physical infirmities.314  The wife had not worked since the par-
ties’ first child was born in 1953.315  The Court focused on certain Buchanan
factors such as “age, health, station and ability to earn a living” and affirmed
the alimony award.316  The Court also expressed concern the wife would need
alimony to pay her health care expenses.317
24. Robison v. Robison, 691 P.2d 451 (Nev. 1984).  There are few reported
facts in this opinion.  Each party had been previously married and each had
children from prior marriages.318  The marriage lasted for approximately
twelve years.319  The wife did own some pre-marriage property.320  The district
303 Applebaum v. Applebaum, 566 P.2d 85, 89 (Nev. 1977).
304 Id. at 88.
305 Jones v. Jones, 571 P.2d 103, 103 (Nev. 1977).
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Ellett v. Ellett, 573 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Nev. 1978).
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1181.
312 Id. at 1182.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id. (quoting Buchanan v. Buchanan, 523 P.2d 1, 5 (Nev. 1974)).
317 Id.
318 Robison v. Robison, 691 P.2d 451, 453 (Nev. 1984).
319 Id.
320 Id.
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court ordered the husband to pay alimony in the amount of $600.00 per month
for two years.321  The husband argued that alimony was not necessary because
his wife earned approximately $40,000.00 per year.322  The Nevada Supreme
Court noted that, although the wife had earned a lucrative income during the
marriage, she had been injured before the divorce and was unable to continue
working.323  Because of this sudden decrease in income, and because the hus-
band retained his profitable businesses, the Court held there was not an abuse
of discretion.324
25. Shank v. Shank, 691 P.2d 872 (Nev. 1984).  The district court ordered the
husband to pay alimony for twenty years, unless his wife remarried.325  The
wife did remarry, and the husband quit paying alimony.326  The wife then
annulled her marriage because, at the time, her new husband was still married
to another woman.327  The district court reinstated alimony but the Nevada
Supreme Court reversed.328  In so doing, the Court adopted a policy statement
set forth by the Missouri Supreme Court:
A former husband is entitled to rely on the remarriage ceremony of the former
wife to recommit assets previously used for alimony obligations to her.
[ ]Unless the remarriage ceremony is taken as conclusive, any latent grounds for
annulment between the remarried spouse and her new husband may remain sus-
pended until the offended spouse seeks annulment, so that the former husband’s ali-
mony obligations may never be certainly determined.
[ ]Even though both former spouses may be innocent, the more active of the two
[the one whose remarriage is later annulled] should bear the loss from the misconduct
of a stranger.329
The Nevada Supreme Court held that remarriage “means the solemniza-
tion or ceremony of remarriage, without regard to whether the remarriage is
later determined to be void or voidable.”330  The termination of alimony at
remarriage illustrates a need-based component of the award.  If alimony were
economic compensation for losses caused by divorce, it should not terminate
upon remarriage.
26. Daniel v. Baker, 794 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1990).  The husband was already
retired when the parties first met.331  The husband enjoyed substantial
wealth.332  By contrast, the wife, who had an eighth grade education, worked at
a bowling alley.333  The wife became the husband’s live-in housekeeper before
marriage.334  The parties were subsequently married for fifteen years.335  The
321 Id. at 455.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 456.
324 Id.
325 Shank v. Shank, 691 P.2d 872, 872 (Nev. 1984).
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 872-73.
329 Id. at 873 (quoting Glass v. Glass, 546 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)).
330 Id.
331 Daniel v. Baker, 794 P.2d 345, 345 (Nev. 1990).
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
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district court awarded alimony of $1,250.00 per month.336  The husband died
while the appeal was pending.337  The Nevada Supreme Court noted the hus-
band was much older than the wife, was ill, and had enjoyed a much shorter life
expectancy.338  The Court also noted a higher alimony award would not have
substantially depleted the husband’s assets.339  The wife had few assets or
hopes of employment.340  She was left with essentially no means of support,
yet she had many more years to live.341  The Court concluded an award
extending beyond the husband’s death would have been just and equitable.342
It therefore remanded the issue for re-determination of a greater alimony
award.343
27. Alba v. Alba, 892 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1995).  This brief opinion is referenced
merely because the Nevada Supreme Court focused on the husband’s ability to
pay when analyzing the district court’s alimony decision.
28. Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998).  This decision examines
cohabitation as an event to modify or terminate alimony.  The Nevada Supreme
Court noted the majority rule that cohabitation can lead to modification or ter-
mination if the “recipient spouse’s need for the support decreases as a result of
the cohabitation.”344  It then adopted the “economic needs” test:
The amount of spousal support reduction, if any, depends upon a factual examination
of the financial effects of the cohabitation on the recipient spouse.  Shared living
arrangements, unaccompanied by evidence of a decrease in the actual financial needs
of the recipient spouse, are generally insufficient to call for alimony modification . . .
The economic needs test properly considers the rights and needs, both fiscal and
personal, of payor and recipient spouses . . .
The test also recognizes the fact that recipient spouse may be left largely unpro-
tected, from an economic standpoint, if he or she breaks off a relationship with a
cohabitant.345
The Court also noted that one reason for awarding alimony is to keep the
recipient spouse off the welfare rolls.346  Finally, the Court held the test fairly
balances the rights of the payor and payee spouses by permitting modification
or termination of alimony solely when financial circumstances so merit.347
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 346.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 764 (Nev. 1998).
345 Id. at 765.
346 Id.
347 See also Spector v. Spector, 929 P.2d 964 (Nev. 1996); Watson v. Watson, 596 P.2d 507
(Nev. 1979).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ203.txt unknown Seq: 34  1-MAY-09 8:57
358 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:325
APPENDIX B
Non-Specific Economic Loss
1. Thorne v. Thorne, 326 P.2d 729 (Nev. 1958).  The Nevada Supreme Court
noted, in dicta, that a wife’s labor contributions to the parties’ income may be
relevant when considering the husband’s continuing obligation to provide for
the wife’s support.348  Presumably, the contributing spouse suffers economic
loss if she does not receive a return on her investment by way of an alimony
award.
2. Winn v. Winn, 467 P.2d 601 (Nev. 1970).  The parties married when the
husband was forty-seven years of age and the wife was thirty-nine years of
age.349  Neither party had been married before.350  The wife had worked for
seventeen years in public employment before marriage.351  She quit her job at
marriage and withdrew $3,400.00 from her retirement fund.352  The wife later
returned to work after one year of marriage because the husband was overly
penurious.353  The marriage only lasted for two and one-half years.354  As set
forth by the Nevada Supreme Court, “[t]he differences that arose between
them, starting with the honeymoon, can largely be attributed to their respective
long-term bachelorhood and spinsterhood.  Mutual obstinacy imbedded by the
years undoubtedly made them irreconcilable.”355  The district court had
awarded the wife $4,000.00 of property and $100.00 per month in alimony.356
The Supreme Court noted a trial court “should not be held to a mathematical
certainty in all cases.  The trial court’s objective is that of fairness which it
achieves by the judge’s personal observation of the parties and the evaluation
of the circumstances as they come before him in the arena of the trial court.”357
The decision is seemingly grounded in the Court’s desire to compensate the
wife for losses occasioned by marriage.
3. York v. York, 718 P.2d 670 (Nev. 1986).  The parties were married for six
years.358  The district court did not award alimony to the wife.359  However,
she was awarded $2,900.00 for providing “other services” relating to household
duties and care for the husband’s children.360  The Nevada Supreme Court
reversed, stating:
[i]t is generally recognized that the marital community is a partnership to which both
parties contribute.  Each spouse contributes his or her industry in order to further the
goals of the marriage.  There was evidence to show [the wife] labored for the benefit
348 Thorne v. Thorne, 326 P.2d 729, 730 (Nev. 1958).
349 Winn v. Winn, 467 P.2d 601, 601 (Nev. 1970).
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 601-02.
353 Id. at 602.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 Id. (citations omitted).
358 York v. York, 718 P.2d 670, 670 (Nev. 1986).
359 Id.
360 Id. at 671.
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of her marital relationship by performing household duties.  She fails, however, to
cite any authority for the proposition that such services are compensable upon
divorce.361
Thus, the opinion suggests that equal division contemplates a return on
any investments into the marriage partnership.
4. Fondi v. Fondi, 802 P.2d 1264 (Nev. 1990).  This is a decision in which the
district court did not find any economic loss and the Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed the denial of alimony.  The parties were married for almost sixteen
years.362  The parties did not have common children, but the husband’s child
from a prior marriage had occasionally lived with them.363  The wife worked
periodically throughout the marriage.364  The husband was a district court
judge.365  The district court awarded rehabilitative alimony of $3,000.00, but
denied any other alimony.366  The Nevada Supreme Court noted the husband
had obtained his education and standing in the legal community before mar-
riage.367  The wife left the marriage with marketable skills, giving her a “viable
means of supporting” herself.368  The wife also left the marriage with cash
from the property division and an interest in the husband’s judicial retirement
plan.369  The Court did acknowledge the district court’s decision was close and
could have been decided another way.370
361 Id.
362 Fondi v. Fondi, 802 P.2d 1264, 1264-65 (Nev. 1990).
363 Id. at 1269.
364 Id. at 1269 n.6.
365 Id. at 1265.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 1269.
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 Id.
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APPENDIX C
Adjunct to Property Division
1. Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678 (Nev. 1988).  The parties were married for
thirty-five years.371  The wife did not pursue employment or a career during the
marriage.372  Rather, she stayed home and raised the parties’ six children.373  In
contrast, the husband earned a Ph.D. and obtained a lucrative university posi-
tion.374  By the time of trial, the husband’s monthly salary exceeded his
monthly expenses by several thousand dollars.375  The wife was fifty-seven
years of age at trial.376  She had no professional skills, was unemployed, and
had never earned more than $600.00 per month.377  There were no appreciable
marital assets to divide.  The district court awarded alimony of $500.00 per
month.378  The Nevada Supreme Court concluded the award was neither just
nor equitable.379  The parties were married for thirty-five years, but the hus-
band was only ordered to pay nine percent of his monthly income to the
wife.380  The husband’s post-divorce economic condition was healthy, whereas
the wife’s economic condition would “result in deprivation, poverty and social
degradation.”381
The Court noted further that the “just and equitable”382 standard includes
what the wife deserves under the circumstances of the case.383  The parties
must be treated fairly.  The Court was
struck by the enormous disparity in the status and quality of life of the two marital
partners that is brought about largely by the “paltry” amount of alimony awarded to
her by the trial court.  It is quite obvious [he] leaves the divorce with almost every-
thing and [she] with almost nothing.  By “everything” we mean principally [his] pre-
sent capacity (a capacity gained by him through the long-term efforts of both parties)
to hold a prestigious position and command a large salary.  Rather clearly, the single
most valuable product of the [parties’] enterprise in the marital partnership is the
Ph.D. degree and high level of professional employability which were gained by
[him] during the marriage.384
The Court went on to describe the “species of property sometimes referred
to as a career asset,”385 which is not easily divisible.  It then repeated the fol-
lowing oft-quoted language:  “Divorces should not become a handy vehicle for
the summary disposal of old and used wives.  A woman is not a breeding cow
371 Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678, 678 (Nev. 1988).
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 679.
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Id. at 678.
379 Id. at 679.
380 The Court also noted the husband’s tax benefits derived from paying alimony. Id. at
680-81.
381 Id. at 681.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 679.
384 Id. at 681-82 (citations omitted).
385 Id. at 682.
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to be nurtured during her years of fecundity, then conveniently and economi-
cally converted to cheap steaks when past her prime.”386  The Court then
referred to a California appellate court decision examining the concept of dis-
tributive justice issue as follows:
In those cases in which it is the decision of the parties that the woman becomes the
homemaker, the marriage is of substantial duration and at separation the wife is to all
intents and purposes unemployable, the husband simply has to face up to the fact that
his support responsibilities are going to be of extended duration—perhaps for life.
This has nothing to do with feminism, sexism, male chauvinism or any other trendy
social ideology.  It is ordinary common sense, basic decency and simple justice.387
Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court:
manifested [its] concern for women like [the wife], an example of a ‘woman who, for
historical and personal reasons, and especially with the long concurrence by her hus-
band, chooses to make her contribution to a marriage by remaining at home to raise
the children of the union. . . . ’  [S]uch a woman might well ‘be victimized rather than
liberated by being required to enter the working world.’388
The Court concluded as follows:
[D]ivorce has [ ]taken [this wife] from relative prosperity to misfortune, if not desti-
tution, and that her treatment by the court below was not just and equitable.  She is
entitled to some fair return based on her thirty-five year contribution to the marital
partnership.  She is entitled after this long marriage to live as nearly as fairly possible
to the station in life that she enjoyed before the divorce.389
2. Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645 (Nev. 1994).  The parties married while
attending college.390  Both parties graduated, and the wife subsequently
obtained a master’s degree.391  The parties moved several times while the hus-
band pursued his training and career as a pilot.392  The parties remained mar-
ried for twenty-seven years.393  At the time of their divorce, the husband was
earning $75,000.00 per year and the wife was earning $43,000.00 per year.394
The husband was forty-eight years of age and the wife was forty-seven years of
age at the time of their divorce.395  The district court awarded alimony in the
amount of $1,300.00 per month for one year and $1,000.00 per month for a
second year so the wife could achieve income parity through further education
and training.396  The husband appealed because the wife had no interest in
more education.397  She was a tenured teacher who was content with her
existing career.398  The wife also appealed, arguing that she should receive ali-
386 Id.
387 Id. (citing In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)).
388 Id. (citations omitted).
389 Id. at 683.  This decision could also be placed within the reliance theory category.
390 Gardner v. Gardner, 881 P.2d 645, 646 (Nev. 1994).
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.  The decision provided no information regarding the marital estate.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 647.
398 Id.
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mony for twelve years in “equitable recognition”399 of the parties’ future earn-
ing capacities and retirement benefits.400
The Nevada Supreme Court observed the lack of evidence that the wife
could earn an additional sum of money within two years.401  The Court noted
the husband had achieved his current success and financial status because the
wife had supported him at the expense of her own career.402  Each time the
parties moved to pursue the husband’s career, the wife was forced to leave her
employment and lose her seniority and retirement benefits.403  Because of the
wife’s contributions to the husband’s career, the husband was able to earn
greater income and retirement benefits.404
The Court relied upon its decision in Heim and concluded that rehabilita-
tive alimony was illusory.405  The wife continually sacrificed in order to pro-
mote the husband’s career desires and opportunities.406  Even though she
worked during the marriage, her employment benefits were substantially
diluted when the marriage ended.407  As explained by the Court, “[t]he magni-
tude of [her] contribution to the community over many years is not fairly recog-
nized by the two-year alimony award . . . .”408  Rather than remand the issue,
the Court simply enlarged alimony to a period of ten years.409
3. Wright v. Osburn, 970 P.2d 1071 (Nev. 1998).  The parties married while
attending college.410  Although both parties graduated, the wife stayed home
after the birth of their first child.411  By contrast, the husband continued in his
schooling and obtained a master’s degree in business administration.412  The
parties were married for fourteen years.413  At the divorce, the district court
granted the parties joint physical custody of their three children.414  The court
further ordered the husband to pay rehabilitative alimony of $500.00 per month
for five years.415  The Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged that the Nevada
Legislature had failed to set forth an objective standard for determining the
appropriate amount of alimony.416  The Court further noted the disparity of
alimony awards in Nevada.417  The Court also acknowledged the alimony fac-
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 Id. at 647-48.
406 Id. at 648.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id.
410 Wright v. Osburn, 970 P.2d 1071, 1071 (Nev. 1998).
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Id. at 1072.
417 Id.
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tors are not weighted.418  However, the Court emphasized the importance of the
district courts’ discretion in these matters.419
The Court noted the wife enabled her husband to obtain an advanced
degree and establish a career.420  As a result, the husband’s post-marriage eco-
nomic opportunities were greater than the wife’s opportunities.421  The Court
held it was unlikely that in five years the wife would be able to earn an income
that would enable her to either “maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed during the
marriage or a lifestyle commensurate with, although not necessarily equal to,
that of [the husband’s].”422  The Court remanded the issue with instructions for
the district court to re-visit and enlarge the alimony award.423
4. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000).  The parties were mar-
ried for twenty-three years.424  The husband was forty-two years of age and the
wife was forty-three years of age at their divorce.425  The husband enjoyed
good health, while the wife was in poor health which affected her ability to
retain employment.426  The husband earned $75,000.00 per year and the wife
earned $14,000.00 per year.427  Nonetheless, the district court denied alimony
because of the wife’s marital and economic faults.428  The Nevada Supreme
Court noted the alimony statute no longer allowed trial courts to consider the
“respective merits of the parties.”429  The Court explained that “[a]limony is
not a sword to level the wrongdoer.  Alimony is not a prize to reward virtue.
Alimony is financial support paid from one spouse to the other whenever jus-
tice and equity require it.”430
Given the disparity in the parties’ incomes, the Court concluded the wife
should not be required to survive on her meager income after enjoying a com-
fortable lifestyle within a long-term marriage.431  The Court noted the wife
would unlikely earn more money in the future, whereas the husband could live
comfortably on his existing salary.432  The Court explained the husband had
“risen steadily to a management position”433 and enjoyed a “far superior earn-
ing power.”434  By contrast, the wife would be “impoverished as a result of the
divorce.”435  The Court remanded the issue with instructions for the district
court to re-visit and enlarge the alimony award.436
418 Id.
419 Id.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 1073.
424 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415, 415-16 (Nev. 2000).
425 Id. at 420.
426 Id.
427 Id.
428 Id. at 416.
429 Id. at 417.
430 Id. at 419.
431 Id. at 420.
432 Id.
433 Id.
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 Id.
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APPENDIX D
Reliance Theory for Lengthy Marriages
1. Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 581 P.2d 860 (Nev. 1978).  The parties were married
for twenty years.437  The wife was thirty-nine years of age and the husband was
forty years of age at their divorce.438  The parties had two minor children, who
were aged seven and fourteen at the time of the divorce.439  One child had
required extra care because of a physical condition.440  The wife never worked
outside the home during the marriage, nor did she acquire marketable skills that
would help her earn a living after the divorce.441  By contrast, the husband had
acquired significant skills during the marriage and built a thriving business.442
He enjoyed a substantial annual income.443  The wife received one-half of the
marital estate, but most of her property was closely held stock with no guaran-
tee of income.444
The district court awarded rehabilitative alimony of $1,250.00 per month
for two years and $250.00 per month until the wife’s death or remarriage.445
The Nevada Supreme Court noted that other jurisdictions had begun question-
ing the wisdom of awarding rehabilitative alimony at the end of long marriages
when there was no evidence the wife was capable of earnings “commensurate
with her former standard of living.”446  The Court further noted the “legitimate
and healthy trend toward consideration of the wife’s ability to become self-
supporting in the determination of alimony,”447 but then set forth the following
pertinent language from another jurisdiction:
[I]n our zeal to correct what may have been inequitably burdensome alimony
arrangements and to recognize the selfhood of women as functioning, independent
persons, we would do injustice to the men and women we seek to treat more equally
if we ignored the facts of life.  A woman who, for historical and personal reasons,
and especially with the long concurrence of her husband, chooses to make her contri-
bution to a marriage by remaining at home to raise the children of the union and who
finds herself, after 23 years, alone with still-growing children to rear, might be vic-
timized rather than liberated by being required to enter the working world.448
. . . [W]here (a husband) has acquiesced in and benefited from her role as wife
and mother for 23 years, he may not now, for his own economic reasons, force her
into a different role without demonstrating that it has economic viability and that the
children will not suffer any detriment from it.449
437 Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 581 P.2d 860, 861 (Nev. 1978).
438 Id.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 Id.
443 Id. at 863.
444 Id. at 862.
445 Id. at 861.
446 Id. at 863.
447 Id.
448 Id. (quoting Kay v. Kay, 339 N.E.2d 143, 147 (N.Y. 1975)).
449 Id.
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The Nevada Supreme Court concluded it was appropriate to “question
awards based on the assumption that wives who have not worked during mar-
riages of long duration will develop the capacity to earn enough to meet
expenses engendered by their lifestyle during marriage.”450  It then cited Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Justice Rose Bird as follows:
Limiting the duration of support so that both parties can develop their own lives, free
from obligations to each other, is a commendable goal.  However, if courts were to
award support with a set termination date simply for this reason and without any
evidence as to the ability of the supported spouse to support himself or herself, great
injustices could result.  Although increasing numbers of married women today are
employed, many others have devoted their time, with their spouse’s approval, to
maintaining the home and raising the children, leaving them no time for employment
outside the home.  This willingness of the wife to remain at home limits her ability to
develop a career of her own.  If the marriage is later dissolved, the wife may be
unable, despite her greatest efforts, to enter the job market.451
2. Wilford v. Wilford, 699 P.2d 105 (Nev. 1985).  The parties were married
in 1963.452  They had two children.453  The wife worked various unskilled jobs
during the marriage, such as food service and housekeeping.454  The wife had
also worked for the parties’ construction company.455  She had received her
high school diploma twelve years after the marriage, but she was unemployed
at trial.456  The district court awarded alimony of $1,000.00 per month for two
years and $500.00 per month for two additional years.457  The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed.458
3. Rutar v. Rutar, 827 P.2d 829 (Nev. 1992).  The parties were married for
eighteen years.459  The wife was unemployed for twelve years because she had
cared for the parties’ two common children and the husband’s two other chil-
dren.460  The wife helped build the parties’ business, which generated substan-
tial profits for the husband.461  The wife was forty-five years of age at the time
of the divorce.462  The district court awarded alimony of $1,000.00 per month
for three and one-half years.463  The wife did not receive any income-producing
property in the property division.  The Nevada Supreme Court noted that “both
parties [had] contributed substantially to the marriage but are left with vastly
disparate earning capacities after the divorce.”464  As a result, the wife would
450 Id. at 864.
451 Id. at 865 (quoting In re Marriage of Morrison, 573 P.2d 41, 51 (Cal. 1978)).
452 Wilford v. Wilford, 699 P.2d 105, 106 (Nev. 1985).
453 Id.
454 Id.
455 Id.
456 Id.
457 Id. at 107.
458 Id.  This decision is irreconcilable with Johnson. See Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 581 P.2d
860, 860 (Nev. 1978).
459 Rutar v. Rutar, 827 P.2d 829, 830 (Nev. 1992).
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 Id. at 831.
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suffer a standard of living far below that to which she had been accustomed.465
The Court simply increased the award amount to $1,700.00 per month and
extended its duration to eight years.466
4. Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1994).  The wife was a licensed
practical nurse, although she quit her employment shortly after marriage.467
The parties had two children.468  The parties were married for twenty-one
years.469  The wife was forty-four years of age at the time of the divorce.470
The district court awarded alimony of $1,500.00 per month for two years.471
The wife’s property division was primarily a minority, non-controlling interest
in the family business.472  Although the value of the wife’s property was
$837,408.00, the wife had no guarantee of income because the husband and his
parents controlled corporate dividends and other distributions.473  The wife was
therefore at the mercy of her former husband and his family regarding her
future income.474  The Nevada Supreme Court noted the wife’s marketability
was not promising and she could not earn a salary allowing her to live in the
manner to which she had become accustomed.475  By contrast, the husband had
developed business acumen allowing him to earn approximately $100,000.00
per year.476  The Court remanded with instructions to both increase and extend
alimony so the wife could live “as nearly as fairly possible to the station in life
she enjoyed before the divorce.”477
5. Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37 (Nev. 1998).  The parties married in 1976
and separated in 1992.478  The divorce proceeding was tried in 1993.479
Although both spouses worked during their marriage, the wife’s business was
unsuccessful while the husband enjoyed business success.480  The wife contrib-
uted to the husband’s success.481  The district court awarded real property to
the wife and a share of the husband’s business, which was to be paid in thirty-
eight monthly increments of $5,000.00.482  The district court denied alimony
465 Id. at 832.
466 Id. at 833.
467 Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 284, 286 (Nev. 1994).
468 Id.
469 Id.
470 Id. at 287.
471 Id.
472 Id.
473 Id.
474 Id.
475 Id.
476 Without reference to the Buchanan factors, the Sprenger Court identified the following
factors to consider when awarding alimony:  “[ ]the wife’s career prior to marriage; [ ]the
length of the marriage; [ ]the husband’s education during marriage; [ ]the wife’s marketabil-
ity; [ ]the wife’s ability to support herself; [ ]whether the wife stayed home with the children
[in lieu of work]; and [ ]the wife’s award” in addition to child support and alimony. Id.
477 Id.
478 Shydler v. Shydler, 954 P.2d 37, 38 (Nev. 1998).
479 Id.
480 Id.
481 Id.
482 Id. at 39.
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because the wife would receive her portion of community property in monthly
increments and “have sufficient funds with which to support herself.”483
The Nevada Supreme Court referred to the husband’s career asset as “bus-
iness acumen” that enhanced his post-marriage economic condition.484  The
wife’s post-divorce earning potential was “well below” the husband’s.485  The
Court thereby held it was unfair for the husband to receive income-producing
property while the wife was forced to dissipate her property share to provide
for her living expenses.486
The Court further held that
[a]limony is an equitable award serving to meet the post-divorce needs and rights of
the former spouse . . . [T]wo of the primary purposes of alimony, at least in marriages
of significant length, are to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce earning
capacities of the parties, and to allow the recipient spouse to live as nearly as fairly
possible to the station in life enjoyed before the divorce.  The individual circum-
stances of each case will determine the appropriate amount and length of any ali-
mony award.487
Interestingly, the Court remanded the issue and noted that alimony, “at
least for a period of rehabilitation,”488 was appropriate.489  The Court also held
that Nevada law does not require alimony to effectively equalize post-marriage
salaries.490
483 Id. at 40.
484 Id. at 39.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 39-40.
487 Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
488 Id. at 41.
489 Reconciling a rehabilitative alimony award with the facts of this case is difficult.
490 Shydler, 954 P.2d at 41.
